Catholic University Law Review
Volume 63
Issue 4 Summer 2014

Article 1

10-17-2014

ALT-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor Organization
Bargain
Michael C. Duff

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael C. Duff, ALT-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor Organization Bargain, 63 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 837 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol63/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

ALT-LABOR, SECONDARY BOYCOTTS, AND
TOWARD A LABOR ORGANIZATION BARGAIN
Michael C. Duff+
I. SECONDARY BOYCOTTS..............................................................................843
A. Secondary Boycotts and Labor Injunctions........................................843
B. Secondary Boycotts and Civil Damages ............................................848
II. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS............................................................................850
A. Introductory Remarks on the Labor Organization Question..............850
B. The Labor Organization Analysis ......................................................853
1. Express Versus Inferred “Dealing With” Purpose ......................854
2. “Dealing With” Purpose Inferred from Protest ..........................860
a. Center for United Labor Action ..........................................860
b. Waugh Chapel South ...........................................................864
C. The Crux of the Statutory Interpretation Problem .............................866
III. TOWARD A “LABOR ORGANIZATION” BARGAIN .....................................869
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................876
Recently, low-wage, non-union workers have staged noteworthy protests and
job actions against allegedly inferior working conditions. Protests against WalMart, strikes against fast food restaurants, and immigration rallies by
unauthorized workers offer ready examples.1 In these protests and job actions,
various non-union labor advocacy groups, sometimes collectively denoted as

+
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errors are mine.
1. See, e.g., Raya Zimmerman, St. Paul: 26 Arrested in Black Friday Protests Over Low
Retail Wages, TWIN CITIES, Nov. 29, 2013, http://www.twincities.com/ci_24625449/st-paul-26arrested-black-friday-protests-over (describing the march of hundreds on behalf of “janitors and
retail employees” in front of a Wal-Mart).
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“ALT-labor,”2 have often organized the involved workers.3 Whether these kinds
of actions represent the leading edge of a broader, discontented precariat—“the
most insecure workers in an economy and a much talked about group among
labor economists”—remains to be seen.4 The increase in ALT-labor activity and
its evolving coordination, whatever their causes, is evident.5
This Article addresses legal problems that might arise from ALT-labor
coordination, which occurs when one ALT-labor group protests on behalf of or
assists another such group.6 Imagine, for example, a situation in which
OURWalmart members7 participate in a protest organized by Fast Food
2. “ALT-labor” groups are “entities outside of the traditional organizing model” that unions
typically implement. “Alt-Labor”, WORKERCENTERS, http://workercenters.com/labors-loophole/
alt-labor/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2014). These groups formed “[i]n response to declines in popularity
and failures to organize workers in the nation’s growing service industries . . . .” Id. “The strategies
of A[LT]-[l]abor groups resemble those of normal unions and their pre-1930s predecessors[,]”
including “[p]rotesting worksites, organizing boycotts, and engaging in ‘wildcat strikes’—
unauthorized, intermittent walkouts targeted to cause maximum disruptions to business operations
. . . .” Id. Because ALT-labor, especially worker centers, actually pre-dates the existence of unions
or modern labor statutes, it logically follows that as modern labor law is dismantled, earlier
prototypes of collective labor groups are emerging. See David Rosenfeld, Worker Centers:
Emerging Labor Organizations–Until they Confront the National Labor Relations Act, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & L. LAW 469, 472–74 (2006).
3. Some of the groups operate within an entire industry, such as Restaurant Opportunities
Center, the New York Taxi Drivers’ Alliance, and Domestic Workers United. See Josh Eidelson,
ALT-Labor, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 29, 2013, http://prospect.org/article/ALT-Labor. Others operate
on the basis of religious or racial justice motivations. See e.g., Home, NEW ORLEANS WORKERS’
CENTER FOR RACIAL JUST., http://nowcrj.org (last visited Aug. 24, 2014) (exemplifying a group
representing racial interests in the labor community); Mission, ARISE CHI., http://arisechicago.org/
(last visited Aug. 24, 2014) (illustrating a group organized around religious beliefs). The group
OURWalmart is an example of a single-employer group, which has staged work stoppages against
Wal-Mart. See Josh Eidelson, Breaking: Wal-Mart Workers on Strike, Defying Firings, SALON
(Oct. 18, 2013, 12:20 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/10/18/breaking_wal_mart_workers_
on_strike_in_florida/ (identifying the group as a “non-union labor group closely tied to the United
Food & Commercial Workers union[]”). See generally JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS:
ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM (2006) (providing a brief review of the
broad array of worker center structures); Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation
in the United States: Some Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 385 (2006) (discussing new
forms of labor institutions).
4. Robyn E. Blumner, The Precariat and Fair Wages, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Aug. 2, 2013,
http://web.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/blumner-the-precariat-and-fair-wages/2134471.
5. As this Article went to print, a national wave of fast food worker strikes reportedly
involving thousands of workers advocating a fifteen dollar minimum wage was underway. See
Steven Greenhouse, Hundreds of Fast-Food Workers Striking for Higher Wages Are Arrested, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2014, at B3 (describing the arrest of “nearly 500 protesters” in “about 150 cities
nationwide” following sit-ins by many “fast-food workers and labor allies . . . .”).
6. See Phil Wilson, Why Union Members Should be Up in Arms Over “Alt-Labor”, LAB.
RELATIONS INST. (last visited Aug. 24, 2014), http://lrionline.com/labor-relations-insight-3
(explaining that ALT-labor “groups focus . . . on organizing worker populations independent from
companies.”).
7. Per OURWalmart’s website, the group’s mission is “to ensure that every Associate [of
Wal-Mart], regardless of his or her title, age, race, or sex, is respected at WalMart.” About Us,
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Forward8 at the premises of a fast food restaurant. Imagine further that the
OURWalmart members attempt to persuade fast food workers to strike or
customers not to enter the restaurant. In such circumstances, OURWalmart
could incur serious legal liability under labor law’s obscure and complicated
“secondary boycott” rules.9
These rules in essence prohibit “labor
organizations” involved in a labor dispute from pressuring “neutrals” to a labor
dispute in specific, proscribed ways.10 Thus, if OURWalmart has a dispute with
Wal-Mart, any pressure it applies to a neutral fast food restaurant could be
subjected to legal scrutiny.11
Secondary boycott complications are made more likely by the recent
escalation of non-union ALT-labor activity.12 Recent fast food worker strikes,
led by groups like Fast Food Forward, are a prime example of ALT-labor in
action. On August 29, 2013, workers in sixty cities walked off the job, a
significant labor development that followed a series of smaller such strikes
earlier in that year.13 The strikes were conducted at McDonald’s, Burger King’s,
and Kentucky Fried Chicken’s restaurants, and extended to the Southern United
States, historically a region hostile to traditional labor union organizing.14 The
impact of the strikes was mixed: “[s]ome targeted restaurants were temporarily
unable to do business because they had too few employees, and others seemingly
operated normally.”15 A second wave of similar strikes occurred in about 100

OURWALMART, http://forrespect.org/our-walmart/about-us/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2014). The
group’s members “join together to offer strength and support in addressing the challenges that arise
in our stores and our company every day.” Id.
8. “Fast Food Forward is a movement of NYC fast food workers to raise wages and gain
rights at work” which is “part of the national movement of low-wage workers fighting for a better
future.” FAST FOOD FORWARD, http://fastfoodforward.org/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (2006) (designating that forcing workers to participate in
strikes can be classified as an “unfair labor practice”).
10. See infra Part I.A (discussing secondary boycotts).
11. This principle also applies across separate employers within the same industry, for as will
be shown, see infra Part I.A, the statute very broadly prohibits the pressuring of neutral employers.
Thus, if Burger King employees apply pressure to change the labor policies of McDonald’s, a
secondary boycott problem could arise. As this Article goes to print, fast food workers continue to
engage in and plan multiemployer work stoppages within the fast food industry and have even
gathered in Illinois for a two-day convention to refine strategies for such coordination. Jessica
Wohl, Fast Food Workers Plan Civil Disobedience in Minimum Wage Fight, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2,
2014, http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-fast-food-strike-20140901-story.html.
12. See Trey Kovacs, Big Labor and NLRB Tactics Evolve, WORKPLACECHOICE (July 30,
2013), http://workplacechoice.org/2013/07/30/big-labor-and-nlrb-tactics-evolve/ (describing the
“proliferation” of ALT-labor groups).
13. Atossa Araxia Abrahamian, U.S. Fast-Food Workers Protest, Demand A ‘Living Wage’,
REUTERS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/29/us-usa-restaurants-strikeidUSBRE97S05320130829.
14. Id.
15. Candice Choi, Fast-Food Workers Stage Largest Protests Yet, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug.
29, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/fast-food-protests-under-way.
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U.S. cities in December 2013.16 The “days without immigrants” rallies of 2006
provide another example of widespread ALT-labor protest.17 Immigration
issues intensified in the early months of that year following news of a federal
legislative proposal that essentially would have classified all employees working
without required immigration documentation as felons.18 In reaction to the
proposed legislation, a variety of ALT-labor groups, and others, coordinated and
organized mass rallies across the U.S.19 The participants included authorized
and unauthorized workers and various allies and supporters of unauthorized
workers.20 Work in many locations stopped as workers joined the protests while
the rallies were underway.21
The various campaigns against Wal-Mart represent another well-known area
of ALT-labor activity.
The “Black Friday” protests, organized by
OURWalmart, are probably the most widely known of these campaigns.22
Finally, there has been a recent groundswell of strike activity by low-wage
employees of federal government contractors. For example, the group Good

16. John Bacon, Fast-Food Workers Strike, Protest for Higher Pay, USA TODAY (Dec. 5,
2013, 12:58 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/12/05/fast-food-strikewages/3877023/. As noted in the New York Times, businesses are paying attention to ALT-labor
activity. See Steven Greenhouse, Advocates for Workers Raise the Ire of Business, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2014, at B1 (claiming that the activities of ALT-labor groups are “start[ing] to get on
businesses’ nerves . . . .”).
17. See Michael C. Duff, Days Without Immigrants: Analysis and Implications of
Immigration Rallies under the National Labor Relations Act, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 93, 93, 95 (2007)
(discussing the traditional labor law connotations of the rallies).
18. See, e.g., Monica Davey, For Immigrants and Business, Rift on Protests, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 2006, at A1 [herinafter Davey, For Immigrants and Business] (referencing a Bonita
Springs, Florida “rally against legislation in Congress cracking down on illegal immigrants”);
Monica Davey, With Calls for Boycott by Immigrants, Employers Gird for Unknown, N.Y. TIMES,
May 1, 2006, at A12 [herinafter Davey, With Calls for Boycott] (making note of “immigration
demonstrations around the country . . . .”). Attendance at a rally held on March 25, 2006 in Los
Angeles was estimated at 500,000 protesters. See Jim Newton, Villaraigosa Tells Where He Stands,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, A1 (noting “500,000 people marched in peace . . . .”). See also Ines
Ferre et al., Thousands March for Immigrant Rights: Schools, Businesses Feel Impact as Students,
Workers Walk Out, CNN (May 1, 2006, 10:21 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/01
/immigrant.day/index.html (last visited February 12, 2007) (explaining that “organizers arranged a
human chain”).
19. See Ferre, supra note 18 (noting that major cities such as New York, Washington, Miami,
Chicago, San Francisco, and Atlanta were rally hubs).
20. See Davey, With Calls for Boycott, supra note 18 (acknowledging that “immigrant rights
groups and others were calling on workers and employers to join” the rallies).
21. See Carol McKinley et al., ‘A Day Without Immigrants’, FOX NEWS (May 1, 2006),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/05/01/day-without-immigrants/ (noting that “[p]rotesters
boycotted work” in locations “across America”).
22. See Zimmerman, supra note 1 (describing that the protesters held marches on Black
Friday to garner attention).
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Jobs Nation,23 in conjunction with a group of unions, coordinated a strike in
January 2014 against Pentagon contractors.24
From the perspective of businesses, the commercial problem presented by
non-union ALT-labor protests—particularly coordinated protests involving
multiple employers—is identical to that presented by traditional union protests:
workplaces may be shut down and customers may be unable to access businesses
while the protests are in progress, which directly threatens commercial activity.25
Public relations considerations also come into play. Typically, ALT-labor
protesters claim employers treat them unfairly.26 The potential for negative
public relations in reaction to the protests is real.27 The negative perception of
a business by potential customers, and others in the community, could harm its
goodwill or other intangible assets.28 Nevertheless, some commentators argue
that business interests do not care about the disruptions or perceptions labor
protests create, because investors do not care.29 Historically, however, business
interests have cared about such volatility,30 and have usually desired the prompt
23. The group describes itself as “workers . . . employed by private companies through federal
contracts, concessions and leases.” About Us, GOOD JOBS NATION, http://goodjobsnation.org/#
about (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
24. Josh Eidelson, Breaking: Pentagon Workers Strike Over Poverty Pay, SALON (Jan. 22,
2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/01/22/breaking_pentagon_workers_strike_over_
poverty_pay/.
25. From its inception, federal labor policy centered on prevention of such threats to the
economy. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (explaining that
employers’ denial of the right of employees to organize can cause “strikes and other forms of
industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing
commerce . . . .”).
26. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Keynote Address: The Moral Dimension of Employment
Dispute Resolution, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 391, 402 (describing that “the . . . unequal bargaining
power” of the parties involved in an employer-employee conflict “implicates moral values
profoundly”).
27. This explains why the risk of labor disputes is routinely included as “forward looking
information” on major corporations’ financial statements involving future risks and uncertainties.
See, e.g., Investors, POOLCORP (Nov. 1, 2013), http://ir.poolcorp.com/profiles/investor/Res
LibraryView.asp?BzID=603&ResLibraryID=66095&Category=43 (acknowledging that such
statements are allowed under “the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995”).
28. James J. Brudney, Collateral Conflict: Employer Claims of RICO Extortion Against
Union Comprehensive Campaigns, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 731, 775 (2010). Indeed, employers will
allege violations of RICO by unions, premised on interferences with employers’ intangible
“property,” such as goodwill and reputation. Id. at 775–76. However, some scholars question the
merit of these claims. See, e.g., id. at 776.
29. See, e.g., Brian Solomon, Memo to the Fast Food Minimum Wage Strikers: Investors
Don’t Care, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2013, 4:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2013/
12/05/fast-food-investors-not-scared-of-minimum-wage-worker-strike/ (stating that “investors
don’t seem to be particularly scared of [] strikers, nor their chances at getting the minimum wage
increase they seek”).
30. For example, the involvement of business lobbyist Richard Berman in the controversy
belies the notion that businesses are unconcerned. See Greenhouse, supra note 16 (noting that
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suppression of labor protests.31 This Article discusses one method business
might employ to achieve suppression: bringing legal actions against protestors
on the theory that the ALT-labor coordination constitutes unlawful secondary
boycotts.32
In reality, the dispute between employers and ALT-labor has already begun.
On November 16, 2012, Wal-Mart filed an unfair labor practice charge against
the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union alleging that the
union had engaged in unlawful picketing.33 Although the theory of unlawfulness
differed from the one that will be discussed in this Article,34 the charge alleged
that OURWalmart was a subsidiary, affiliated organization, or agent of the
United Food and Commercial Workers.35 Although the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) informally resolved the charge without having to reach
the substance of the allegations,36 if the case had been actively litigated, the
status of OURWalmart would have needed to be determined; either it was an
agent of the union in connection with the conduct complained of, or,
alternatively, it was a labor organization in its own right, and therefore
independently subject to liability under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).37 This Article discusses the threshold question of whether ALT-labor
groups independently possess status as labor organizations under the NLRA in
order to determine whether they are capable of engaging in secondary boycotts.38
Berman ran “full-page ads attacking the Restaurant Opportunities Center,” which is “one of the
nation’s largest worker centers . . . .”).
31. Indeed, the common law conceived of such protest as simple criminal conspiracy. See
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 112–16 (1842) (rejecting the general view of the
time but chronicling its prevalence in the mid-nineteenth century).
32. As discussed further in this Article, ALT-labor liability turns on whether a group is a
“labor organization.” If a group is a labor organization, it is capable of violating a variety of labor
laws. Therefore, the Article focuses on violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)’s
secondary boycott prohibitions under sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 303 of the NLRA, as amended. See
also Eli Naduris-Weissman, The Worker Center Movement and Traditional Labor Law: A
Contextual Analysis, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 232, 263–71 (2009) (providing an exhaustive
discussion of the variety of potential violations).
33. Lawrence E. Dubé, Wal-Mart Bid To Block ‘Black Friday’ Action Requires Retailer To
Prove UFCW’s Objective, BLOOMBERG LAW, http://about.bloomberglaw.com/law-reports/walmart-bid-to-block-black-friday/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
34. The Wal-Mart charge alleged that the union and its “affiliates” engaged in unlawful
“recognitional” picketing under section 8(b)(7) of the NLRA, id., which this Article does not
discuss.
35. Id.
36. See Advice Memorandum from the Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., Case 26-CP-093377 (Apr.
10, 2013), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/26-CP-093377.
37. The NLRA prohibits only “employers” and “labor organizations” from engaging in
specified conduct. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), (b) (2006).
38. A complete taxonomy of ALT-labor groups is beyond the scope of the Article. However,
it may be conceded that any group receiving all of its support from one or more labor unions could
much more readily be conceived as an agent of the union or unions. It may just as readily be
acknowledged that groups receiving no support from unions and engaging in no protest over terms
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Part I of this Article discusses secondary boycotts. Because ALT-labor
groups cannot violate the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA unless they
are labor organizations, Part II engages in an extended discussion of the
surprisingly complicated question of when a “group” is considered an NLRA
labor organization subject to the secondary boycott provisions. In light of the
complexity inherent in determining whether ALT-labor groups are labor
organizations, Part III suggests that the time may be ripe for a “bipartisan”
modification of the NLRA’s labor organization definition. Anticipating the
objection that no modification of labor law is likely in light of the persistence of
legislative gridlock, this Article underscores that employers have badly wanted
to modify the NLRA labor organization definition for two decades, and actually
achieved a bipartisan modification in 1996, only to see the compromise vetoed
by President Clinton.39 Finally, this Article argues that organized labor may be
similarly amenable to compromise on a narrowing of the labor organization
definition, particularly given ALT-labor groups’ vulnerability to liability under
the secondary boycott provisions, organized labor’s increasing embrace of ALTlabor, and a growing precariat40 that will not be easily organized using traditional
labor organizing principles.
I. SECONDARY BOYCOTTS
A. Secondary Boycotts and Labor Injunctions
Traditionally, one of the quickest ways for businesses to quash labor
protests—besides summarily firing employee activists41—was to obtain courtissued labor injunctions.42 However, the present generation of business leaders,
having come of age during docile labor times43 and without a need to understand
traditional labor law, may not realize that obtaining labor injunctions in the
federal courts to suspend peaceful labor activity of the type presently engaged
in by ALT-labor is typically not possible. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932

and conditions of employment are much harder to think of as a “labor advocacy” group of the kind
that it is under discussion in the Article. This Article focuses on groups in the murky middle that
engage in some activity traditionally carried out by unions, but are not structured like unions, and
do not formally claim to represent employees for purposes of collective bargaining. Even these
groups come in a dizzying array. They are big and small, national and local.
39. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 52 (4th ed. 2004).
40. See The Precariat, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/
buzzword/entries/precariat.html (last updated Feb. 16, 2011) (defining “precariat” as “a social
group consisting of people whose lives are difficult because they have little or no job security and
few employment rights . . . .”).
41. A firing of this sort is now unlawful. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3).
42. FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 1 (1930).
43. See Steven Greenhouse, Share of the Work Force in a Union Falls to a 97-Year Low,
11.3%, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2013, at B1 (discussing acceleration of “the long decline in the number
of American workers belonging to labor unions . . . .”).
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broadly prohibits federal courts from issuing such injunctions.44 An important
exception to this rule, however, is that injunctions against “labor organizations”
remain available for certain conduct specifically prohibited by the NLRA.45
Secondary boycotts are an important example of NLRA-prohibited conduct and
they are subject to federal court injunction.46 A secondary boycott47 has
44. See Act of Mar. 23, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
101–115) (preventing federal courts from “issu[ing] any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute . . . .”). Many states
have in effect “little Norris-LaGuardia Acts.” See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1808 (2003);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-3-118 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-112 (West 2013); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 380-7 (LexisNexis 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-701 (2003); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/1 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-6-1-6 (LexisNexis 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60904 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:844 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 5 (2007); MD. CODE
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 4-314 (LexisNexis 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 6 (2005); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 185.13 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-3-1 (2012); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 807 (McKinney 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-08-03 (2004);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 662.080 (West 2013); 43 PA. CONS. & STAT. ANN. § 206i (West 2009);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-10-2 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-19-2 (LexisNexis 2011); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 49.32.072 (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.56 (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 27-7-101 (2011). This issue has broader applicability under state law, but such considerations
are beyond the scope of this Article.
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (l).
46. Some commentators focus on the potential for ALT-labor groups to violate the
recognitional picketing provisions of the NLRA, especially section 8(b)(7)(C). A full discussion
of those provisions is beyond the scope of this Article. As a general proposition, “labor
organizations” picketing for recognition or bargaining must comply with a precise regulatory
framework or they risk violating the NLRA. See generally S.F. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary
Workers. v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 794 (1974) (demonstrating how the D.C. Circuit analyzes
recognitional picketing cases). However, it may be difficult to characterize ALT-labor groups as
possessing the necessary recognition or bargaining object. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (stating that
picketing or threatening to picket “any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization” is an unfair labor practice). Protest
activity may be protected by the NLRA’s publicity provisos or characterized as “area standards”
picketing, which is also protected by the NLRA. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist.
Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 207 n.42 (1978) (explaining that “area-standards picketing”
was recognized as a right under the NLRA in the 1960s); Int’l Hod Carriers & Calumet Contractors
Ass’n, 133 N.L.R.B. 512, 512–13 (1961) (stating that the NLRA does not disallow area-standards
picketing). From the employer’s vantage, protest activity is more reliably characterized as a
secondary boycott. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 222–27
(1982) (holding that a union’s refusal to handle goods from the Soviet Union in protest of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan violated secondary boycott provisions of NLRA). However, if an ALTlabor group is considered a labor organization under the NLRA, it is capable of violating the
recognitional picketing provisions of the Act.
47. The term secondary boycott is not defined with precision. Indeed, there were no secondary
boycott provisions in the first iteration of the NLRA. However, the Taft-Hartley Act added the
initial secondary boycott prohibition to section 8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA in 1947. United Food &
Commercial Workers Local 1996 & Visiting Nurse Health Sys., Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 421, 423–24
(2001). The Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 (LGA) closed off certain loopholes to the prohibition,
refined the secondary prohibition to its present form, and included the alterations in section
8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA. Id. at 424–25. Further, the LGA independently outlawed a specific form
of secondary conduct in which a union and a neutral employer agree that the neutral employer will
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traditionally been explained as some “combination to influence A by exerting
. . . economic or social pressure against persons” with whom A deals.48
The statutory definition of “boycott” has a specialized meaning that is
different than the common conception of a boycott as, for example, a consumer’s
refusing to purchase the goods of a company with which he or she has a dispute.
A “boycott” is an organized refusal, a collective action, meant to pressure a
neutral employer during a labor dispute in any number of ways including by
striking, picketing, or “boycotting” the purchase of products or services.49
Workers may naturally wish to support the causes of other workers.50 But
American labor law has always sought to prevent general strikes, meaning
simultaneous work stoppages of workers “in all or most industries.”51 Labor
organizations are not permitted to expand the “front” of a labor dispute they may
have with one employer, known as the “primary” employer, to the premises of
a “secondary” or “neutral” employer.52 If they do, federal courts may grant
neutral employers injunctive relief and damages in order to suppress the
conduct.53 Two policies underlie this limitation. The first is containing primary
labor disputes to minimize injury to interstate commerce. The second is the
notion that it is not fair to allow the pressuring of a neutral employer, which has
neither the ability nor duty to control the labor relations of the involved union
and the primary employer.
If the NLRB finds that a labor organization engaged in a secondary boycott,
it is required (in the absence of very prompt settlement) to seek a temporary

not handle the products of a different employer with whom the union has a primary labor dispute.
See Ets-Hokin Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. 839, 844–45 (1965) (explaining that, in that case, unions
unlawfully convinced Ets-Hokin to remove another company from a construction project).
48. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 42, at 43. There are, of course, some who object
to the whole idea of a secondary boycott on strictly moral grounds. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler,
Secondary Boycotts and the Breakdown of Civil Society, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 3, 2012, 8:32
AM),.http://www.volokh.com/2012/05/03/secondary-boycotts-and-the-breakdown-ofcivilsociety/
(claiming that “substantial risks” accompany secondary boycotts).
49. See 520 S. Mich. Ave. Assocs., Ltd. v. Unite Here Local 1, No. 13-1938, slip op. at 11
(7th Cir. July 29, 2014).
50. See, e.g., DANIEL GROSS & STAUGHTON LYND, SOLIDARITY UNIONISM AT STARBUCKS
22, 23 (2011) (characterizing “solidarity unionism” as a movement that passes from one worker to
another, and explaining that when Starbucks baristas in New York City went on strike that
“[s]olidarity [] poured in from around the world”).
51. General Strike, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/
definition/american_english/general-strike (last visited Aug. 28, 2014). This was a central purpose
of the Taft-Hartley reforms, Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass’n v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612, 623–24
(1967), although it is difficult to conceive of the early American state as excessively hostile to any
form of strike, JOSIAH BARTLETT LAMBERT, IF THE WORKERS TOOK A NOTION: THE RIGHT TO
STRIKE AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 21–23 (2005).
52. See Douds v. Metro. Fed’n of Architects, Eng’rs, Chemists & Technicians Local 231, 75
F. Supp. 672, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (explaining the nexus requirement between the “front” and the
picketing union).
53. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 691–92 (14th ed. 2006).
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injunction in federal district court to restrain the conduct.54 If the court grants
the injunction, there are at least two significant consequences. First, all present
secondary picketing must cease, and severe sanctions will attach for violations
of the injunction.55 Second, as a practical matter, strikes or any other labor
activity will likely be broken by an injunction.56 If federal courts embarked on
a course of enjoining ALT-labor, the probable response of protesting
employees—especially those without the benefit of legal counsel—would be to
sharply curtail protest activity.
There are two ways that the conduct of a labor organization could possibly
violate section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. First, it is potentially unlawful for a labor
organization “to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed
by any person . . . to engage in[] a strike or a refusal . . . to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods . . . or to perform
any services . . . .”57 Second, it is potentially unlawful for a labor organization
“to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce . . . .”58 However, for the conduct to be unlawful,
it must be coupled with a proscribed object.59 In the case of a secondary boycott,
a violation occurs when any of the aforementioned conduct is engaged in with
the object of “forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person . .
. .”60
Thus, to continue with the hypothetical presented at the beginning of this
Article, if OURWalmart pickets at a protest organized by Fast Food Forward at
the premises of a fast food restaurant with the object of persuading fast food
workers to strike, or even with the object of forcing any person to cease doing
business with any other business, then OURWalmart is in jeopardy of violating
the NLRA’s secondary boycott provision. OURWalmart may argue that it is
merely protesting the fact that all workers are being paid substandard wages or

54. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (2006).
55. See Ahmed A. White, The Crime of Staging an Effective Strike and the Enduring Role of
Criminal Law in Modern Labor Relations, 11 J. LAB. & SOC’Y 23, 31–33 (2008), available at
http://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/pubpdfs/white/White11WUSA.pdf-(describing-applicable
criminal sanctions).
56. See JULIE GREENE, PURE AND SIMPLE POLITICS: THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR
AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM, 1881-1917 85 (1998) (noting “[m]any [] strikes . . . [are] met with defeat
through injunctions handed down by state and federal courts . . . .”).
57. Id. § 158(b)(4)(i).
58. Id. § 158(b)(4)(ii).
59. Section 158(b)(4) lists four proscribed objects. This Article addresses only the “secondary
boycott” object.
60. Id. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). Some narrow provisos to the rule exist, but most are beyond the
scope of this Article.
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working in substandard conditions.61 But unless OURWalmart proceeds with
great caution in communicating and investigating the basis for this “area
standards” message—that is, a message meant only to communicate facts
showing that a particular employer provides pay and benefits that are less than
what is normally provided by employers in the local area62—the NLRB may
deem the activity “secondary” and, therefore, unlawful.63
If OURWalmart is, for example, suggesting to workers that they should not
go to work, or is persuading customers to boycott a fast food restaurant, a serious
“cease doing business” issue arises, for the underlying presumption of this
strictly enforced provision is that OURWalmart is surreptitiously pressuring a
neutral employer in the hope of indirectly improving working conditions at WalMart.64 Moreover, the NLRB need only find that an object of OURWalmart is
to cause some person to cease doing business with any other person in order to
establish a violation of the NLRA.65 Additionally, in some instances a “cease
doing business” object simply may be inferred. For example, in International
Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied International, Inc.,66 the Supreme Court stated,
“[w]hen a purely secondary boycott ‘reasonably can be expected to threaten
neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss’ . . . the pressure on secondary parties
must be viewed as at least one of the objects of the boycott or the statutory
prohibition would be rendered meaningless.”67 In other words, if the secondary
61. It might be argued that because OURWalmart would merely be present at what was in
effect the lawful primary protest of Fast Food Forward, OURWalmart’s activity would not really
be secondary because it would not be trying to affect its own labor conditions through coercion of
a neutral employer. Rather, OURWalmart would be attempting to impact the labor conditions of
other employers through “solidarity picketing.” Of course, it would all depend on what
OURWalmart was doing or saying. However, to the extent the group was engaged in secondary
conduct, and had a secondary object, the fact that Fast Food Forward was simultaneously engaging
in primary labor protest would not insulate OURWalmart from liability. See NLRB v. Omaha
Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 856 F.2d 47, 50–51 (8th Cir. 1988).
62. Under the publicity proviso, a peaceful area standards campaign that uses handbilling or
bannering, truthfully advises the public of a labor dispute, that does not have a proscribed secondary
object or conduct element such as picketing or disruptive or otherwise coercive non-picketing
conduct, implicates First Amendment concerns and does not violate section 158(b)(4). See Circle
Grp., L.L.C. v. Se. Carpenters Reg’l Council, 836 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (citing
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 583–
84 (1988)).
63. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 7 & Andy J. Eagn Co., 345 N.L.R.B. 1322, 1331
(2005) (“When area standards picketing is involved, the burden is on the union to [] make
reasonable inquiry to determine whether . . . the picketed employer is meeting area standards,
wages, and benefits. Otherwise, the purported purpose of area standards picketing may be deemed
pretextual, and evidence of improper motive found.”).
64. See Richard A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding NLRB Interpretation of Section
8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 905, 908 (2005)
(describing the structure of a secondary boycott).
65. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 688–89 (1951).
66. 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
67. Id. at 224.
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activity of OURWalmart resulted in “substantial loss”68 to the “neutral” fast food
restaurant, an unlawful secondary object would likely be presumed.69
It must be emphasized that employees may express solidarity for one
another’s causes. Thus, the mere presence of ALT-labor group A at a protest
function of ALT-labor group B—including, for example, a joint presence at a
coordinated ALT-labor rally—does not in itself convert protest to secondary
boycott activity. Members of ALT-labor group A may be present and may
protest the employment policies of the employer of group B. What ALT-labor
group A cannot lawfully do is strike, or “threaten” or “coerce” anyone to “cease
doing business” with the employer of ALT-labor group B to effectuate changes
to that employer’s employment policies. For, with respect to employer B, ALTlabor group A has no primary labor dispute.70
B. Secondary Boycotts and Civil Damages
In addition to the risk of injunction, the NLRA provides employers with a
private right of action for compensatory damages arising from secondary activity

68. In an earlier case, NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760, 377
U.S. 58, 72 (1964), the Supreme Court held that certain unions did not violate the NLRA when they
limited secondary picketing of retail stores to asking customers not to buy the products of firms
against which one of the unions was striking. The Court found that consumer picketing of the
neutral retailer was permissible unless the picketing was “employed to persuade customers not to
trade at all with the secondary employer . . . .” Id. at 72. However, the Court later altered that rule
by holding that “[p]roduct picketing that reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with
ruin or substantial loss simply does not square with the language of the purpose of [NLRA] §
8(b)(4)(ii)(B).” NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 614–15 (1980).
69. This interpretation reads the “object” requirement out of the statute entirely. The
conclusion begs the question: are the injured employers truly neutral because the court failed to
identify any object on the part of the union to do injury to them? The conclusion is actually the
fruition of early developments in cases that focused on injuries to neutrals in the context of limited
“object evidence.” See, e.g., NLRB v. Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans & Vicinity, 407
F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting that although the statute requires a “cease doing business”
object, an objective to cause “serious disruption of an existing business relationship” is sufficient
to satisfy the statutory requirement). The union in International Longshoremen’s Ass’n argued
there was not a “primary” at all, that the primary-neutral distinction was completely collapsed, and
that reference to statutory “neutrals” was a legal fiction. Brief for Petitioner at 28–29, Int’l
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982) (No. 80-1663). Whereas in mixed
object scenarios a court will find a labor organization engaged in unlawful secondary activity when
only one of its objects is proscribed by the NLRA, Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341
U.S. at 689, the courts have relaxed even that forgiving standard by whittling away its predicate to
a skeletal core which requires only the possibility that the fruit of an unlawful object—even an
unintended one—be foreseen.
70. See NLRB v. Ironworkers Local 433, 833 F.2d 1024, 1024 (9th Cir. 1989) (“To determine
whether concerted activity is primary or secondary, it is necessary to ascertain whether ‘the object
of [the activity] is to affect the labor policies of th[e] primary employer’ or whether the activity is
‘engaged in for its effect elsewhere.’”). Thus, a violation could arise if, in addition to the presence
of ALT-labor group A at employer B’s premises, group A encourages work stoppages, employer
boycotts, or engages in any similar conduct with a “cease doing business” object.
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that is found to violate section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA.71 The availability of courtawarded civil damages for section 8(b)(4) violations is an anomaly of the
American labor law system in which administrative agencies adjudicate most
claims and compensatory damages are unavailable.72 The NLRA also provides
that anyone injured in business or property by a secondary boycott possesses a
private right of action for damages.73 The provision renders any “labor
organization” in violation of the secondary boycott prohibition of section
8(b)(4)(B) broadly liable for damages and the cost of any suit resulting from the
violation.74 Employers may recover business losses caused by a labor
organization’s peaceful but unlawful secondary activities.75 Further, the NLRA
may arguably act as a kind of protection to ALT-labor because it preempts state
law actions for damages premised on a peaceful secondary boycott theory.76
Nevertheless, the NLRA exposes ALT-labor groups to civil liability for damage
to business relationships, loss of business profits, idled equipment, and
additional personnel required to operate a business during the period of an illegal
work stoppage.77
Interestingly, to the extent that an ALT-labor group is found to be an agent of
a union rather than a labor organization in its own right, there is developing
authority that it would not be liable under the NLRA.78 To consider how this
provision might operate, modify some facts of the earlier ALT-labor
hypothetical. This time, imagine that Fast Food Forward members appear at a
local Wal-Mart in support of an OURWalmart protest. Imagine further that the
protest is extremely successful and that many customers decline to cross the
ALT-labor picket lines. If a federal district court concluded that a “labor
organization” had “threaten[ed], coerce[ed], or restrain[ed] any person engaged
in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce”79 with the object of “forcing
or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
71. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258 (1964).
72. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (2006) (allowing the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to
provide temporary relief it finds “just and proper”).
73. See 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (indicating that anyone injured by unfair labor practices may
“recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit”).
74. See id.
75. See Morton, 377 U.S. at 260 (holding that, although the petitioner’s protest was peaceful,
the lower court’s award to petitioner “cannot stand” because of petitioner’s secondary boycott
behavior).
76. See, e.g., Labor-Ready Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Tri-State Building & Construction Trades
Council Local 667, No. 2:99-0037, 2001 WL 1358708, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 21, 2001) (holding
that the NLRB may assert jurisdiction over claims advanced under state law if the behavior that
forms the basis of those claims is “unlawful secondary activity”).
77. However, punitive damages are unavailable. See COX, supra note 53, at 771.
78. See, e.g., Jung Sun Laundry Group Corp. v. Laundry, Dry Cleaning, & Allied Workers
Joint Bd., No. 10 Civ. 468 (RMB)(JLC), 2010 WL 4457135, at *1, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2010)
(citing Wild Edibles Inc. v. Indus. Workers of World Local 460/640, No. 07 Civ. 9225(LLS), 2008
WL 4548392, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2008)).
79. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person[,]”80 the ALTlabor group could be liable for the loss of business occasioned by the action. It
might also be liable for other compensatory costs involving items such as
personnel modifications, inventory control, and enhanced on site security.81
Clearly, these costs could escalate and be very difficult to bear by an ALT-labor
group.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
A. Introductory Remarks on the Labor Organization Question
Secondary boycott prohibitions apply only to labor organizations.82 Thus, if
ALT-labor groups are not labor organizations, they are not bound by the
NLRA’s secondary boycott provisions and the groups’ peaceful labor protest
activities are likely immune from federal court injunctions.83 Employers and
their allies avoid the question of whether ALT-labor groups qualify as labor
organizations by arguing that unions are behind ALT-labor and, therefore, ALTlabor should be bound to the same rules that bind labor unions.84 The role of
unions in encouraging ALT-labor is becoming well known,85 and the AFL-CIO
openly acknowledges and embraces the connection between unions and ALTlabor groups.86 Tellingly, the AFL-CIO underscores that its increasingly
formalizing relationship with worker centers began in 2006,87 the year in which

80. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
82. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2006) (defining practices that constitute “unfair labor practice[s]”
when performed by “a labor organization or its agents . . . .”).
83. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 451 (1987)
(holding that, in the absence of specific Congressional authorization to the contrary, federal courts
may not issue labor injunctions in peaceful labor disputes).
84. See, e.g., Stefan J. Marculewicz & Jennifer Thomas, Labor & Employment Law: Labor
Organizations by Another Name: The Worker Center Movement and its Evolution into Coverage
Under the NLRA and LMRDA, ENGAGE, Oct. 2012, at 79, 79 (characterizing ALT-labor worker
centers as “no different[] than the traditional labor organization”).
85. See, e.g., Richard Berman, Worker Centers: A Backdoor for Unions, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/10/14/workercenters-are-just-a-backdoor-for-unions (exemplifying the actions of the Center for Union Facts to
advance knowledge about worker centers).
86. See Worker Center Partnerships, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/About/WorkerCenter-Partnerships (last visited Aug. 29, 2014) (acknowledging that “the AFL-CIO has formed
partnerships with worker centers and other groups of working people who do not have the legal
right to collective bargaining”). Further, the strengthening ties between organized labor and ALTlabor was a primary topic of discussion at a 2013 AFL-CIO convention. See Mark Vorpahl, At
AFL-CIO Convention, Leaders Ask: What Direction for Labor?, TRUTHOUT (Sept. 11, 2013, 4:55
PM),-http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/18769-at-afl-cio-convention-leaders-ask-what
direction-for-labor (noting that ALT-labor groups were “highlighted at the convention”).
87. Id.
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the massive “Day Without Immigrants” rallies transpired.88 Unions consistently
provide expertise and counsel to ALT-labor.89 Still, by historical labor
movement standards, the involvement of unions in ALT-labor is complex and
vague. Community groups, worker centers, and other non-union advocacy
groups often lead the tactics, and almost always the financing, of ALT-labor
protests.90 This does not mean, of course, that ALT-labor is not receiving
considerable assistance from unions.91 But there is substantial evidence that
many “activist charitable foundations”92 have been heavily funding ALT-labor,
particularly worker centers.93 The Department of Labor has also directly funded
worker centers.94
All of this complexity makes it difficult to agree with the simplistic
formulation that “unions are behind” worker centers or other ALT-labor groups.
Such funding, moreover, implicates broader civil society protest and nudges the
context of ALT-labor slightly away from traditional, unmixed labor activism.
For example, it is easier to conceive of an ALT-labor group funded by the Ford
Foundation as a social activist group than it is to see a group funded and directed
exclusively by the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union
as a social activist group.
The inchoate, elusive involvement of unions in ALT-labor—as opposed to
their direct, traditional involvement—has multiple explanations.
The
notoriously high employee turnover rate of low-wage workers95 makes them
especially hard for unions to organize using traditional methods.96 Workers

88. See Teresa Watanabe & Joe Mathews, Unions Helped to Organize ‘Day Without
Immigrants’, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at B1.
89. See, e.g., id. (mentioning that organized labor was instrumental in making the “Day
Without Immigrants” march successful). See also Bacon, supra note 16 (acknowledging that the
Service Employees International Union helped coordinate protests in December 2013).
90. See Jarol B. Manheim, The Emerging Role of Worker Centers in Union Organizing: A
Strategic Assessment 9–16 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Working Paper, 2013), available at
http://www.workforcefreedom.com/sites/default/files/WFI%20Manheim%20Study%2011-212013.pdf.
91. The Service Employees International Union, for example, has ramped up financial
support to the fast food ALT-labor groups reportedly contributing $15 million since January 2013.
Bruce Horovitz et al., Fast Food Workers Rally for Higher Wages, PNJ.COM (May 15, 2014),
http://archive.pnj.com/usatoday/article/9114245.
92. See id. at 13 (exemplifying the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s use of this phrase).
93. Id. Charitable organizations, including notable groups like the Ben & Jerry’s Foundation,
the Marguerite Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Kresge Foundation, contribute to the
worker center movement. Id. at 15–20.
94. Id. at 21.
95. Arindrajit Dube, T. William Lester & Michael Reich, Minimum Wage Shocks,
Employment Flows and Labor Market Frictions 17 (Inst. for Research on Labor and Emp’t,
Working Paper No. 149-13, 2013), available at http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/14913.pdf.
96. See Molly Korab, Can Fast-Food Workers Raise Wages With One-Day Strikes?, NEW
REPUBLIC (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114147/fast-food-workers-one-
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often voluntarily depart from a low-wage workplace before they can be
organized.97 Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,98 unauthorized workers fired during traditional union
organizing campaigns are not entitled to remedies under the NLRA,99 which
makes immigrant workers understandably reluctant to support a union openly.100
Given the difficult legal terrain for organizing, unions may be reluctant to devote
significant resources to organizing low-wage workers. However, they may be
willing to render some lesser level of assistance, especially where outside
charitable organizations are contributing to the cause.
Unions may also be better able to face workers in unsuccessful campaigns
outside of the traditional labor organizing drive. Low-wage workers seem to
understand that the possibility of failure in nontraditional drives is high and that
they are involved in a Sisyphean struggle in which they “‘have nothing to
lose.’”101 The probability of success may be understood from the beginning as
low, and the union seems less likely to be blamed if it fails.
Sinister explanations abound when there is any union involvement in ALTlabor. Commentators assert that unions are using worker centers to insulate
themselves from labor law liability.102 Under the NLRA, unions, as
acknowledged labor organizations, are proscribed from engaging in certain
conduct.103 Commentators allege that unions evade such proscriptions by acting
through ALT-labor.104 This curious argument assumes that unions would
deliberately expose potential future members to surrogate legal liability.105 Less
day-strike-and-future-labor-organizing (“[O]ld labor laws rely on a sense of permanency that isn’t
as prevalent today.”).
97. See id.
98. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
99. See id. at 151–52 (holding that the NLRB’s jurisdiction is not broad enough to permit it
to grant awards to unauthorized workers).
100. See Ruben J. Garcia, Ten Years After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: The
Power of a Labor Law Symbol, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 659, 669 (2012) (indicating that
undocumented workers may be unwilling to stand up for their rights).
101. Steven Greenhouse, A Day’s Strike Seeks to Raise Fast-Food Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,
2013, at A1 (quoting Columbia Professor of Political Science Dorian T. Warren).
102. See Kris Maher, Nonunion Worker Advocacy Groups Under Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., July
24,-2013,-http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887429712045786283846775530
(suggesting that unions are blurring the lines between what is an organized union and what is a
working center for the purpose of escaping financial filing requirements).
103. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2006).
104. Berman, supra note 85 (“[Worker centers’] legal status allows them to dodge all of the
financial transparency, governance and organizational regulations established by federal law.
There are no officer elections, no annual financial filings with the federal government and no
guarantees that they’re acting on behalf of the employees they claim to represent.”). See also
Marculewicz & Thomas, supra note 84 (claiming that ALT-labor groups “avoid the legal duty of
accountability to the workers they represent” that is characteristic of unions).
105. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce grapples with explaining this motivation as follows:
In the purest sense, [worker centers clearly functioning as mere surrogates for unions]
may not be [] worker center[s] at all, but merely another in a series of secondary
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curious is the argument that unions, in acting through ALT-labor, are simply
avoiding a purportedly tainted union “brand.”106 According to this argument,
the cause of unaffiliated low-wage restaurant workers is more sympathetic than
that of union organizers or supporters.
Whether ALT-labor groups are de facto agents of unions is of questionable
legal significance. A union may lawfully organize employees and employees
may lawfully assist unions. Indeed, the organization and representation of
employees by unions are the most basic protected activities under the NLRA.107
Whether unions provide to employees or receive from employees organizing
assistance directly or through intermediaries appears to be immaterial.
Employees independently possess NLRA rights to engage in “concerted
activities” under the NLRA.108 They may choose to exercise these rights with
the guidance and technical direction of an organization. Union assistance of
employees to exercise rights through ALT-labor is the same as any actor helping
workers to obtain rights they already possess under the NLRA. “Labor
organizations,” however, are regulated under both the NLRA and the LaborManagement Relations Disclosure Act (LMRDA), and are required to operate
by certain rules, regardless of the rights possessed by employees.109 Ultimately,
questions of agency only have legal significance when there is a violation of the
rules. The more difficult question is whether ALT-labor groups are capable of
violating these rules in their own right and not as the agents of unions.110
B. The Labor Organization Analysis
The question, therefore, is whether ALT-labor groups are “labor
organizations.” Under the NLRA, the term “labor organization” is defined as
“any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the
mechanisms for building alliance structures or appealing for public approbation while
obscuring somewhat the union label, presumably because the union strategists find such
limiting of transparency advantageous for some reason.
Manheim, supra note 90, at 35 (emphasis added). A less-tortured argument is that employee
participation in alternative forms of employee representation could help individuals develop
“political skills and voice functions” that may serve as a precursor to unionization. See Michael H.
LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New Millennium: Redefining a Labor Organization Under
Section 8(a)(2) Of The NLRA, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1651, 1703 (1999).
106. See Manheim, supra note 90, at 35 (claiming that unions need ALT-labor groups to reach
new classes of workers).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
108. Id.
109. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b), 412, 439, 440.
110. For example, in response to the ALT-labor activities leading up to and planned for Black
Friday 2012, Wal-Mart filed charges against the United Food and Commercial Workers Union
although the activities in question involved the ALT-labor group OURWalmart, apparently because
Wal-Mart was unsure of the legal status of OURWalmart. See Tony Lee, Walmart Files Charges
Against UFCW Union, BREITBART (Nov. 18, 2012), http://www.breitbart.com/BigGovernment/2012/11/17/Wal-Mart-Files-Charges-Against-UFCW-Union.

854

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:837

purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work.”111 ALT-labor groups are surely “organizations of any kind,” given that
they, in part, attempt to address employee grievances, advancing the cause of
employees in labor disputes, and improving employee wages, rates of pay, hours
of employment, or conditions of work in some manner.112
It may not always be as clear, however, that ALT-labor groups have the
purpose of addressing these statutorily enumerated work-related issues by
“dealing with” employers. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “purpose” as “[a]n
objective, goal, or end.”113 Regrettably, the NLRA does not define purpose.
Therefore, one is led into the traditional morass of determining whether an
“objective, goal, or end” has been happily and explicitly stated or, more
problematically, must be inferred from surrounding conduct.
1. Express Versus Inferred “Dealing With” Purpose
Given that ALT-labor organizations’ charters sometimes define the purpose
of the groups as “dealing with” employers,114 the groups could not easily argue
that they did not possess such a purpose. However, explicit acknowledgement
of a “dealing with” purpose is not required under the NLRA to establish that a
group falls within the definition of a labor organization. In NLRB v. Cabot
Carbon Co.,115 the Supreme Court established that the purpose of a putative
labor organization may be discovered not only by reference to the organization’s
stated purpose, but also by determining what the organization does in reality.116

111. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
112. See, e.g., About Us, supra note 7 (providing the homepage of OURWalmart, and
describing how the group communicates its mission to Wal-Mart management). The group asks
Wal-Mart to listen to its associates, have respect for the individual, recognize freedoms of
association and speech, fix its Open Door policy, pay a minimum of thirteen dollars per hour and
make full-time jobs available for associates who want them, create dependable and predictable
work schedules, provide affordable healthcare, provide every associate with a policy manual,
ensure equal enforcement of policy and anti-discrimination rules, provide every associate equal
opportunity to succeed and advance in his or her career, and offer wages and benefits that ensure
that no associate has to rely on government assistance. Sign the Declaration, OURWALMART,
http://forrespect.org/sign-the-declaration/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2014).
113. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1356 (9th ed. 2009).
114. See, e.g., Thompson Ramo Woolridge, Inc. & Gen. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers
Local Union No. 298, 132 N.L.R.B. 993, 994 (1961), enforced, 305 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1962) (“The
best evidence of the purpose of the Association may be found in its charter and bylaws.”).
115. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
116. Id. at 213. The NLRB has underscored this point. In Electromation, Inc. & International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 1049, 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 996 (1992), a case in which
non-union employee committees were found to be labor organizations under the NLRA, the NLRB
stated that “[p]urpose is a matter of what the organization is set up to do, and that may be shown
by what the organization actually does.” See also Keeler Brass Auto. Grp. & Puckett, 317 N.L.R.B.
1110, 1113 (1995) (citing id.).
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In Cabot Carbon Co., multiple affiliated employers established and supported
“employee committees” in several plants.117 The committees’ explicit purpose
was to meet regularly with management to consider and discuss problems of
mutual interest, including grievances and handling of “grievances at nonunion
plants and departments . . . .”118 In addition to this explicit purpose, it was also
obvious that the established committees made many types of work-related
proposals that were actively considered by management.119 Thus, the Court
observed, “[c]onsideration of the declared purposes and actual functions of these
[c]ommittees shows that they existed for the purpose, in part at least, ‘of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours
of employment, or conditions of work.’”120 Similarly, it is possible to argue that
ALT-labor groups satisfy the “purpose” element when their actual functions
demonstrate that they exist—at least partially—for the purpose of dealing with
employers, even where their foundational charters or mission statements express
no such purpose.
It may be necessary, therefore, to consider whether ALT-labor groups’ actual
activities reveal their “dealing with” purpose when no such purpose is explicitly
stated. That consideration may allow the NLRB, or a court, to construct the
purpose element. However, on occasion, the NLRB argues that a group is not a
labor organization because there is insufficient evidence to formulate a “dealing
with” purpose from the functions and activities of the group, even if the group
has explicitly declared a “dealing with” purpose.121 This overemphasis on
inferred purpose can be a distraction when explicit evidence of purpose exists,
and thus, no reason exists for inferring a purpose.122 For example, the Restaurant
Opportunities Center of New York (ROC-NY) at one time behaved like a
statutory labor organization in that it routinely negotiated with employers on
behalf of employees.123 The NLRB’s Division of Advice found that it was not
117. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. at 205–06.
118. Id. at 206.
119. Id. at 207 (finding the committees “made and discussed proposals and requests respecting
many other aspects of the employee relationship, including seniority, job classifications, job
bidding, makeup time, overtime records, time cards, a merit system, wage corrections, working
schedules, holidays, vacations, sick leave, and improvement of working facilities and conditions[,]”
and that “Respondents’ plant officials participated in those discussions and in some instances
granted the [c]ommittees’ requests”).
120. Id. at 213 (first emphasis added).
121. See, e.g., Advice Memorandum from the Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., Cases 2-CP-1073 &
2-CB-20787 (Nov. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Advice Memorandum, Cases 2-CP-1073 & 2-CB-20787]
(demonstrating that the NLRB will disregard an entity’s defined purpose when the entity’s activities
deviate from that purpose).
122. See Duff, supra note 17, at 134–36.
123. See Duff, supra note 17, at 135. See also Hyde, supra note 3, at 392–94. ROC-NY has
recently tempered its claims that it bargains on behalf of employees. However, ROC-NY still
supports a “restaurant industry roundtable,” described by the group as “a collaboration of restaurant
owners, workers, government agencies, city officials, and ROC-NY.” The New York City
Restaurant Industry Roundtable, ROC-NY, http://rocny.org/high-road-organizing/nycrir/ (last

856

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:837

a labor organization, however, because “ROC-NY’s conduct has not been shown
to constitute a pattern or practice of dealing over time. Rather, ROC-NY’s
attempts to negotiate settlement agreements with the [e]mployers here were
discrete, non-recurring transactions with each [e]mployer.”124 One issue with
this statement is that the Supreme Court was clear in Cabot Carbon Co. that a
group need not be collectively bargaining to achieve labor organization status,125
and a “pattern and practice of dealing over time” is reminiscent of collective
bargaining. Even more problematically, whatever an ALT-labor group may be
doing functionally is not of greater significance than an explicit avowal of a
“dealing with” purpose.126 Thus, assessing groups’ actions as evidence of
purpose should not be controlling.
In the context of broadly inferring a “dealing with” purpose, the NLRB has
determined that minimal contacts between a labor “group” and an employer are
usually insufficient to establish that the group is a labor organization.127 The
confusion lies in attempting to determine primarily whether any bilateral activity
between a group and an employer must be demonstrated to show that a group is
a statutory labor organization; and, secondarily, what the nature of that bilateral
activity must be. For example, recent NLRB authority holds that some “bilateral
mechanism” between a putative labor organization and “target” employer must
be established before the agency will find that labor organization status exists.128
visited Aug. 29, 2014). The group encourages all New York City restaurants to join the roundtable
and “develop strategies that help restaurants take the ‘high road’ to profitability.” Id.
124. Advice Memorandum, Cases 2-CP-1073 & 2-CB-20787, supra note 121.
125. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. at 211–12 (“It is therefore quite clear that Congress, by
adopting the broad term ‘dealing’ and rejecting the more limited term ‘bargaining collectively,’ did
not intend that the broad term ‘dealing with’ should be limited to and mean only ‘bargaining with’
as held by the Court of Appeals.”). One scholar believes that:
worker centers like the Workplace Project, and worker groups like ROC-NY, are quite
likely to be statutory labor organizations. They do indeed raise grievances with particular
employers on behalf of particular employees. Even if this is not collective bargaining, it
is similar to activity that has been held to constitute the activity of dealing with
employers. Moreover, it is hard to come up with any compelling policy reason why such
groups should be exempt from disclosure requirements, or restrictions such as the thirtyday limit on organizational picketing that bind more traditional unions.
Hyde, supra note 3, at 408.
126. For example, ROC-NY previously claimed that, as of 2007, it had engaged in six
campaigns against employers for back wages and discrimination claims for food service workers,
negotiated a settlement for workers from a Brooklyn deli, and negotiated a settlement with a
restaurant involving “compensation for discrimination, paid vacations, promotions, the firing of an
abusive waiter, and a posting in the restaurant guaranteeing workers the right to organize and the
involvement of ROC-NY in the case of any future discrimination.” Duff, supra note 17, at 135.
The group also previously advertised to employees: “If you are a restaurant worker who has
problems with your employer, call us or come by ROC-NY!” Id. That message was an explicit
admission that ROC-NY existed for the purpose in whole or in part of dealing with employers.
127. Advice Memorandum, Cases 2-CP-1073 & 2-CB-20787, supra note 121.
128. See, e.g., Syracuse Univ. & Teamsters Local 317, 350 N.L.R.B. 755, 757–58 (2007); E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. & Chem. Workers Ass’n, 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894–95 (1993);
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The bilateral mechanism must involve exchanges of proposals on NLRAdefined subjects between a labor organization and management.129 However,
the NLRB has stated that “if there are only isolated instances in which the group
makes ad hoc proposals to management followed by a management response of
acceptance or rejection by word or deed, the element of dealing is missing.”130
This attempted line drawing between a bilateral proposal “pattern and practice
mechanism” and statutory “bargaining” is unclear and confusing. Why is it that
a statutory labor organization may be found without “bargaining,” but that a
“pattern and practice of exchanging proposals over time” implies that a group is
a labor organization? There is little indication that the NLRB intends to clarify
the distinction. However, the confusion is not solely attributable to NLRB
decisions. Rather, there is little difference between collective bargaining and
“dealing with” in the applicable statutory scheme. While collective bargaining
is usually the negotiation of a comprehensive collective bargaining
agreement,131 bilateral discussions—even over time—may have narrower
objectives. The problem, however, is that the NLRA’s definition of “bargaining
in good faith” is so broad that it begins to merge imperceptibly with the NLRB’s
“pattern and practice” invention. The NLRA makes it in an unfair labor practice
for an employer or a labor organization to refuse to bargain in good faith over
terms and conditions of employment, and:
requires the parties to “meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement.” This requirement
has been interpreted as establishing a general duty between an
employer and its employees’ bargaining representative “to enter into
discussion with an open and fair mind, and a sincere purpose to find a
basis of agreement.”132
Logically, under Cabot Carbon Co., the NLRB or a court might find that a
group is a labor organization even if it does not engage in statutory bargaining
as defined above and merely openly expresses the purpose of “dealing with”
employers. Equally logically, under the NLRB’s formulation, a group will not
be found a labor organization unless its relationship with an employer amounts
to a “bilateral mechanism of pattern and practice over time.”133 The NLRB’s
pattern and practice interpretation has thus far inured to ALT-labor’s benefit in
that it has allowed certain groups to escape “labor organization” status because
they do not have the necessary durable relationship with any particular

Electromation, Inc. & Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 1049, 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995 n.21
(1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
129. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 995 n.21.
130. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. at 894.
131. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 213 (1959).
132. Bryant & Stratton Bus. Inst., Inc. v. NLRB, 140 F.3d 169, 182 (2d Cir. 1998).
133. Advice Memorandum, Cases 2-CP-1073 & 2-CB-20787, supra note 121.
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employer.134 As a practical matter, a finding of “no labor organization status”
implies no liability for ALT-labor groups under any NLRA prohibitions
applicable to labor organizations.
However, it is often risky to rely on the NLRB’s statutory interpretations
given the reality of hostile appellate review.135 The tension between the
Supreme Court’s discussion and potentially static definition of labor
organization status and the NLRB’s discussion and more functional definition
of the same is palpable. So long as the NLRB is acting as the prosecutor in
deciding, for example, whether an ALT-labor group has a “dealing with”
purpose rendering it liable for NLRA violations, it may have discretion whether
to issue an administrative complaint.136 With the exception of the Fourth
Circuit’s opinion in Waugh Chapel South, LLC v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Union Local 27,137 there is little authority on the question of what labor
organization definition or analysis federal courts will apply, and that is where
real trouble may lurk for ALT-labor. District court judges may be more inclined
to apply Cabot Carbon Co.’s potentially more static formulation. The NLRB’s
dynamic “pattern and practice over time” formulation, although accepted by the
Fourth Circuit, cannot comfortably be regarded as a majority judicial approach
to the labor organization question.
One suspects Cabot Carbon Co.’s discussion of “pattern and practice” issues
throughout the opinion,138 a discussion which was arguably obiter dictum, had
the possibly unintended consequence of underemphasizing that the case most
strongly turned on its finding of an express purpose. To see how this thinking
can go awry, imagine a workplace “committee” in which employees clearly
participate and which clearly states in its charter that it exists for the purpose of
bargaining with the employer in that workplace regarding wages. The statute
says nothing about the additional requirement that it actually deal with the
employer regarding wages. Cabot Carbon Co. does not so hold. Rather, it
permits a fact finder to evaluate what the group does as part of the overall

134. Id.
135. See Ellen Dannin, Hoffman Plastics as Labor Law—Equality at Last for Immigrant
Workers?, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 393, 394–95 (2009) (explaining that the written labor “law as it is
applied today[] is the result of decades of ‘judicial amendments.’”).
136. See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 124
(1987) (differentiating between the powers of the NLRB and those of the NLRB General Counsel);
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985) (concluding that an agency’s decision not to enforce
is unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act and the common law of judicial review).
However, when a statute contains provisions requiring enforcement action in specified
circumstances, a court has meaningful standards to apply concerning a non-enforcement decision
and is authorized to undertake judicial review. Heckler, 470 U.S at 833–34.
137. 728 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2013).
138. Cabot Carbon Co. did not utilize the “pattern and practice” phraseology explicitly.
Rather, the case used an analysis functionally equivalent to the NLRB’s later-developed pattern
and practice analysis. In other words, Cabot Carbon Co. was effectively the progenitor of the
analysis.
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analysis. It strains credulity to claim that a group does not exist for the reason
stated in its founding documents.
The NLRB itself has acknowledged in several cases that it is unnecessary to
infer a “dealing with” purpose from “pattern and practice” when it can otherwise
be determined;139 it simply does not apply the principle consistently. In
Coinmach Laundry Corp. & Local 729, Coalition of Democratic Employees,140
a representation case, the NLRB upheld without discussion a regional director’s
determination that a group started by three employees, and consisting of
approximately fifty employees, was a labor organization, although it had
unsigned by-laws, never took minutes, was not recognized by any employer or
certified by the NLRB, did not negotiate any contracts, did not collect dues from
employees, had no income, assets, or paid staff, and operated out of one
employee’s house.141 One employee testified that, “the Petitioner was created
to ‘organize, negotiate contracts regarding wages, working conditions, hours of
employment . . . [and] grievance procedures.’”142 That was enough for the
regional director to conclude that the organization in question was a labor
organization within the meaning of the NLRA,143 and the NLRB affirmed the
static determination.144
In support of the decision, the regional director cited a number of cases in
which the NLRB found that groups were statutory labor organizations in
circumstances where there was no evidence of “pattern or practice” or of the
existence of a bilateral mechanism.145 Each of the cases involved very early
organizational efforts and was either a representation case or involved unfair
labor practices in nascent organizing drives.
This is logical. At the inception of an organizing drive, there can be no
bilateral mechanism or pattern of bargaining with an employer, and in the case
of unaffiliated labor organizations, of the kind apparently at issue in Coinmach,
there is likely no practice of dealing with any employer. NLRB decisions
suggest that the NLRB is more willing to look exclusively at express purpose
and ignore “pattern and practice” in representational or early organizational
cases. The problem is that the decisions establish a principle that the barest

139. See, e.g., Coinmach Laundry Corp. & Local 729, Coal. of Democratic Emps., 337
N.L.R.B. 1286, 1286 (2002).
140. 337 NLRB 1286 (2002).
141. Id. at 1286–87.
142. Id. at 1287.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 1286.
145. Id. (citing Yale New Haven Hosp. & Yale New Haven Hosp. Police Benevolent Ass’n,
309 N.L.R.B. 363, 363 (1992); Betances Health Unit, Inc. & Betances Health Unit Staff Ass’n, 283
N.L.R.B. 369, 375 (1987); Comet Rice Mills Div. Early Cal. Indus. Inc. & United Rice Workers of
Stuggart, 195 N.L.R.B. 671, 674 (1972); E. Dayton Tool & Die Co. & E. Dayton & Hawker Tool
Emps.’ Indep. Union of Dayton, Ohio, 194 N.L.R.B. 266, 266 (1971); Butler Mfg. Co. & Butler
Indep. Union, 167 N.L.R.B. 308, 308 (1967)).
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explicit expression of a purpose to represent employees is sufficient as a matter
of law to establish labor organization status.
It is difficult to reconcile Coinmach with ROC-NY. The explicit “dealing
with” purpose evidence in the latter was much greater than the evidence in the
former. Such sharp inconsistency may not go unnoticed by courts in the context
of secondary boycotts. Courts in secondary boycott cases may utilize the
NLRB’s representational cases to find ALT-labor groups “labor organizations”
by virtue of the groups’ express statements of “dealing with” purpose.
2. “Dealing With” Purpose Inferred from Protest
Perhaps this much is clear: an ALT-labor protest with no “dealing with” or
bargaining purpose and with no “bilateral mechanism” involved should not be
adequate in itself to render an ALT-labor group a “labor organization.” The
difficulty is that protest may create discussion leading to consideration of how
much dialogue would be required to establish a bilateral mechanism or a “pattern
and practice” of interaction and consideration of proposals. Assuming, however,
an ALT-labor group is solely protesting employer practices, its “message”
appears more like a unilateral demand and less like any form of bilateral
discussion or invitation to engage in bargaining. In the posture of protest, the
group’s demand is as much a message to the general public about the targeted
employer’s practices as it is a communication to the employer with which it has
a dispute.
Courts have previously utilized avoidance canons when interpreting portions
of the NLRA that might have rendered predominantly expressive activity
unlawful under the statute.146 Indeed, there are a number of “publicity provisos”
built into the statute that operate in practice as a kind of constitutional safety
valve.147 Broadly interpreting the labor organization definition in such a way as
to convert social advocacy groups into labor organizations subject to NLRA
injunction carries obvious chilling potential. Therefore, courts may in protest
contexts interpret the definition of “labor organization” narrowly once it is clear
that there is no union activity involved.
a. Center for United Labor Action
This avoidance rationale may respond to an objection raised by commentator
David Rosenfeld: that something akin to protest may in fact be deemed a form
of “dealing with.”148 Rosenfeld recounts the case of Center for United Labor
Action & Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co.149 in which the Center for United Labor
Action (CULA), arguably an NLRA labor organization, was found by the NLRB

146. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 576–78 (1988).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B) (2006).
148. Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 485–86.
149. 219 NLRB 873 (1975).
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not to be such an organization.150 The question was of threshold importance
because the charging party, Sibley, a retail-clothing store in Rochester, New
York, alleged that CULA was engaged in a secondary boycott against it.151 The
primary employer, it was alleged, was Farah Manufacturing, a clothing
manufacturer, which was involved in a nationwide labor dispute with the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (the ACWA).152 The charge was
filed against both the CULA and the ACWA.153 The ACWA, an admitted
NLRA labor organization, quickly and predictably settled the case, after the
NLRB found administratively that it had engaged in an unlawful secondary
boycott.154 CULA, which became involved in the labor dispute once it was clear
that the ACWA was meeting with little success, declined to settle, and the
secondary boycott case went to trial.155 The question presented was whether
CULA was a “labor organization” so as to bring it within the ambit of the
NLRA’s secondary boycott provisions. The NLRB found that it was not.156 The
decision is explainable by reference to constitutional avoidance principles if it is
accepted that there was a substantial argument that a putative labor organization
was engaging in predominantly expressive activity.
What did CULA do? Well, to begin with, unlike much of ALT-labor,157
CULA defined itself as a defender of unions and as an aggressive supporter of
the union cause.158 It supported union strikes.159 It engaged in picketing other
retailers carrying Farah’s products, participating directly in the union campaign,
and across state lines.160 It even assisted striking employees of other unionized
employers involved in wholly separate labor disputes.161 In sum, it was engaged
in a broad variety of activities in these disputes, including representing
discharged workers before the state unemployment commission in opposition to

150. Id. at 873.
151. Id. at 876.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 874.
154. Id. at 876.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 873.
157. This is beginning to change in the fast food worker context and one increasingly sees
those ALT-labor workers advocating explicitly for a union. For example, in a new wave of rallies,
strikes, and protests by thousands of fast food workers on September 4, 2014, the workers carried
signs and chanted slogans for “15 and a union.” Seth Freed Wessler, ‘We’re a Movement Now’:
Fast Food Workers Strike in 150 Cities, NBC NEWS (Sept. 4, 2014, 4:46 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-sight/were-movement-now-fast-food-workers-strike150-cities-n195256.
158. Id. at 877.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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an employer’s position, and assisting employees at a plant who wanted to
unionize.162
However, CULA’s primary activity was picketing,163 albeit in a manner that
would almost certainly violate the NLRA if it were a labor organization. In
connection with the labor organization question, it was quite evident that
employees participated in CULA.164 It was equally evident, however, that
despite all of the labor organization-like activity in the record, CULA never
attempted to negotiate or communicate with Sibley.165 It had solely engaged in
protest activity. The question for the administrative law judge (ALJ) hearing the
case was whether by engaging in concerted activities or assisting and persuading
employees to do so, CULA was “dealing with” Sibley.166 Despite finding that
CULA’s activity rendered it an NLRA labor organization,167 the ALJ
nevertheless refused to find a secondary boycott violation because “such a result
tends to warp the structure and distort the policy and purposes of the Act.”168
Sibley argued that such a conclusion would encourage “outside organizations”
to engage in secondary boycotts.169
Perhaps not surprisingly, the NLRB on appeal did not adopt the reasoning of
the ALJ insofar as he found CULA to be a labor organization, although it did
uphold his finding of no violation.170 The NLRB concluded that the ALJ
erroneously equated support for a “social cause” with the desire to represent
individuals in pursuit of a social cause.171 In rejecting the ALJ’s reasoning the
NLRB said, “[s]upport for a cause, no matter how active it may become, does
not rise to the level of representation unless it can be demonstrated that the
organization in question is expressly or implicitly seeking to deal with the
employer over matters affecting the employees.”172
It might be true that the NLRB majority was applying extra-statutory criteria,
or even an incorrect standard altogether, when it additionally opined that “to
qualify as a labor organization under our Act the organization must be selected
and designated by employees for the purpose of resolving their conflicts with
employers . . . .”173 The labor organization doctrine as it exists today does not

162. Id. at 878.
163. Id. at 878.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 879.
167. Id. Rosenfeld concluded that the ALJ did not find labor organization status. Rosenfeld,
supra note 2, at 487.
168. Id. at 879. The ALJ cited the familiar rule of statutory construction that “a thing may be
within the letter of a statute and yet not within a statute . . . .” Id.
169. Id. at 880.
170. Id. at 873.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 487 (citing id.).
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support the NLRB’s proposition. The gist of the opinion, however, seems to be
that defining a labor organization as the ALJ did would embroil the Act in
interpretive difficulties. Notably, at that time, the NLRB did not yet have the
benefit of labor-specific avoidance canon cases like Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.
v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council174 and NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago,175 which emphasized in the context of the NLRA
that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress.”176 To hold that an activist group is a NLRA labor organization
merely because it protests repeatedly and employees participate, and thereby to
expose the group to civil liability for peaceful expressive activity, appears to
activate this principle.177
It is worth noting that some commentary on Center for United Labor Action
at the time of the decision claimed that the case stood for the proposition that
almost any group admitting employees to its membership, including broader
civil society protest groups, might constitute a labor organization.178 Even
outside the confines of Center for United Labor Action, some scholars at that
time assumed that all kinds of groups might be labor organizations. For
example, one commentator argued in connection with the celebrated case
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization179 that the
dissident group of minority employees in opposition to the incumbent union in
that case was itself probably a labor organization.180 Such a contention may

174. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
175. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
176. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575.
177. Notably, the Supreme Court’s treatment of speech issues in the context of secondary
picketing is far from compelling. Although a full analysis of the foundational case in this area, Int’l
Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951), is beyond the scope of this
Article, it is clear the Court did not apply anything approaching “strict scrutiny” to section 8(b)(4)
of the NLRA, nor did it hew closely to avoidance canon principles. To expand the doctrine to
groups whose labor organization status is unclear may have the effect of reopening decades-old
discussions on picketing and speech issues glossed over in the union context. As commentator
Charlotte Garden has argued: “the Court has yet to place union speech on the same footing as the
speech of other social movements or to present a coherent theory of the First Amendment as it
applies to labor speech.” Charlotte Garden, Labor Values Are First Amendment Values: Why Union
Comprehensive Campaigns Are Protected Speech, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617, 2647 (2011). ALTlabor may represent a conflation of movements, creating confusion in the courts and, accordingly,
promoting unpredictability in litigation.
178. See, e.g., Comment, Protest Groups and Labor Disputes-Toward a Definition of Labor
Organization: Center for United Labor Action, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 796, 801–02 (1976)
[hereinafter Protest Groups].
179. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
180. See Protest Groups, supra note 178, at 800 & n.33. The employees engaged in protest
activities in a manner that was at odds with the incumbent union in the workplace, and the
employees were fired. Emporium Capwell Co., 420 U.S. at 53–55. The Supreme Court ultimately
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strike twenty-first century readers as odd. It would seem to follow that the
minority dissident group, in addition to being denied the protection by section 7
of the NLRA, may additionally have been capable of violating section 8(b).
b. Waugh Chapel South
Perhaps such an avoidance policy was also operating sub silentio in the Fourth
Circuit’s Waugh Chapel South, LCC v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union Local 27181 opinion. In that case, a commercial real estate developer of a
shopping center in Anne Arundel County, Maryland planned to lease a storefront
unit to Wegmans Food Markets.182 The United Food and Commercial Workers
Union and the Mid-Atlantic Retail Food Industry Joint Labor Management Fund
opposed the project because the supermarket was not unionized.183 A union
official allegedly threatened to oppose any future projects of the developer in
which the supermarket would be a tenant.184 Because the union’s dispute was
with the supermarket, the developer was a neutral party to the labor dispute. The
union and the fund subsequently filed fourteen legal challenges to the project.185
Each of the challenges was dismissed, withdrawn, or mooted by subsequent
developments.186
The developer, thereafter, sued the union and the fund in federal district court
under the NLRA, arguing that the legal challenges filed against it as a neutral
party were a sham, and thus a form of secondary boycott.187 The court held that
while sham litigation could violate the secondary boycott provisions of the
NLRA and a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the union had
engaged in such conduct,188 the court determined that the fund was not a “labor
organization” subject to the NLRA.189 The court noted that in order to fall under
the NLRA’s definition of labor organization, an entity must meet the “dealing
with employers” requirement, and that neither the purpose nor the activity of the
fund involved “dealing with” employers.190 In coming to this conclusion, the
court cited circuit precedent holding that no labor organization status may be
applied in the absence of a bilateral mechanism through which “there is a
‘pattern or practice’ over time of employee proposals concerning working

concluded that they were deprived of NLRA protection for acting in derogation of their exclusive
bargaining representative. Id. at 71–73.
181. 728 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2013).
182. Id. at 357.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 358.
187. Id. at 356.
188. Id. at 367.
189. Id. at 362.
190. Id. at 361–62.
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conditions, coupled with management consideration thereof . . . .”191 The court,
in other words, applied the NLRB’s interpretive formulation from cases like E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. & Chemical Workers Ass’n192 and Electromation,
Inc. & International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 1049,193 and
placed significant emphasis on the fact that the fund’s charter explicitly
prohibited it from “‘participating directly or indirectly . . . in union collective
activities.’”194
The conclusion is puzzling because the fund was involved in the alleged sham
litigation with the union, and therefore participating directly in union activities
in violation of its charter. This was the same litigation that the court said
rendered the union potentially liable to a secondary boycott violation.195
One could certainly argue that the fund’s actions in violation of its charter
made its subsequent characterization of its organizational purposes suspect. It
could also be argued that a series of legal actions between the contractor and the
fund (an organization in which employees participated) amounted to a bilateral
mechanism in which proposals between employer and group were exchanged,
such as settlement proposals and demand. Nevertheless, the court concluded
that:
the only fact suggesting any interactions between the Fund and an
employer concern[ed] the alleged secondary boycott. There is plainly
no “bilateral mechanism” when the only alleged contact between an
employee entity and management is an unfair labor practice directed
against an employer.196
It seems reasonable to speculate that the court was anxiously dismissive of the
argument that the fund was a labor organization because it faced a difficult
question involving whether alleged sham litigation could violate the secondary
boycott provisions of the NLRA. On the merits of the case, the court was unsure
about the appropriate “sham legal action” standard to apply when multiple
instances rather than a single incident of a sham legal action were alleged.197 In
the context of a difficult First Amendment issue involving court access, one
suspects the court preferred a “clean” jurisdictional posture. The labor
organization issue, had it continued to be pressed by the fund, was not clean. By
dismissing the fund, the jurisdictional issue—and potentially an additional
constitutional issue—was avoided.

191. Id. at 361 (citing NLRB v. Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Cent., 36 F.3d 1262, 1270 (4th
Cir. 1994)).
192. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
193. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992).
194. Waugh Chapel South, LLC, 728 F.3d at 361.
195. Id. at 361–62, 367.
196. Id. at 361–62.
197. Id. at 363.
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C. The Crux of the Statutory Interpretation Problem
Whether ALT-labor groups are NLRA labor organizations, therefore, appears
in practice to be a function of at least three factors: (1) how a particular group
explicitly defines its purpose, (2) a fact-finder’s inference of “dealing with”
purpose drawn from the group’s actions, and (3) whether the group’s actions
arguably permitting an inference of “dealing with” purpose implicate
constitutionally-protected conduct.198 In the NLRB’s Electromation decision,
one NLRB member noted “that Cabot Carbon’s rejection of the notion that
‘dealing with’ is synonymous with collective bargaining failed to delineate the
lower limits of the conduct: if ‘dealing with’ is less than bargaining, what is it
more than?”199 The question has not yet been answered in a satisfactory manner.
The risk faced by ALT-labor today is that the lower limits are in flux and could
“descend” to the conduct in which it is customarily engaged.
At the heart of the confusion may be a failure to distinguish between “internal”
and “external” labor organization applications. The broad labor organization
definition was crafted with an eye to internal workplace applications. It was
intended to outlaw the internal “company union.” The idea was to define labor
organization broadly and then, through operation of section 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA, to prevent an employer from controlling the organization.200 The
resulting statutory formulation makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
“to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it . . . .”201
The question of who can violate the secondary boycott provisions, on the other
hand, is a “labor organization” external application of Taft-Hartley, a version of
the NLRA that was obviously not in existence when the labor organization
definition was initially conceived. The external application arises not in the
context of the putative labor organization’s internal interaction with employees
of a particular employer, but rather in the context of the organization externally
interacting with other employers. Cabot Carbon Co. and the NLRB’s
subsequent interpretation of the case in internal application contexts do not
speak to that situation. To have any chance of placing the situation in proper
statutory context the preferable approach is to consult Taft-Hartley’s legislative
history.

198. Eli Naduris-Weissman describes the general interpretive approaches at play in this area
as “textualism” and “intentionalism.” See Naduris-Weissman, supra note 32, at 273–74. This
Article proposes classifications that describe in context and somewhat informally what courts and
the NLRB appear to be doing with respect to the labor organization definition. Regardless of the
classification scheme, the lesson to be drawn is that cases, as a practical matter, may be decided
different ways in different contexts. That is the dilemma ALT-labor faces.
199. Electromation, Inc. & Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 1049, 309 N.L.R.B. 990,
1002 (1992).
200. See id. at 992–93.
201. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006).
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In lieu of an exhaustive examination of the legislative history of the TaftHarley Act or the LMRDA respecting the labor organization definition,202 this
Article explores roughly contemporaneous court decisions in secondary boycott,
“external application” contexts. In Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB,203 a case
decided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals a few years after the enactment of
the Taft-Hartley Act, the court upheld the NLRB’s determination that a farm
workers’ union could not be held liable under the NLRA’s secondary boycott
provisions because it was comprised exclusively of agricultural workers not
covered under the NLRA.204 Accordingly, no “employees” participated in the
group and, by definition, the union did not qualify as an NLRA labor
organization.205 In the course of the court’s discussion, there was no
consideration of the different “external” circumstances to which the labor
organization definition was being applied.206
Soon after the enactment of the LMRDA in 1959, which amended and
tightened the secondary boycott provisions, the D.C. Circuit addressed
secondary boycotting in its International Organization of Masters, Mates &
Pilots of America, Inc. v. NLRB207 decision. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
struggled with whether Masters, the involved putative labor organization,
engaged in alleged secondary boycotting and was a statutory labor
organization.208 The NLRB concluded that it was, and applied the secondary
boycott provisions to the group, finding a violation.209 Masters argued that it
could not be held responsible for an unfair labor practice as a labor organization
because the pilots for whose benefit the secondary boycott had been affected
were not employees under the NLRA.210 However, unlike the situation in Di
Giorgio Fruit, some of the group’s members were statutory employees,211
thereby satisfying the section 2(5) statutory requirement that employees must
participate for a group to be found a labor organization. After eventually
concluding that Masters was a section 2(5) labor organization, the court said,
202. There was, primarily, great discussion about how labor organizations should be restrained
and little discussion about what they, in fact, were. See Marculewicz & Thomas, supra note 84, at
80–82. The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act shows that some early committee drafts
would have permitted an employer to lawfully form an employee committee provided that the
employer would only “discuss” workplace issues with the committee. See LeRoy, supra note 105,
at 1704–05. The proposal was defeated because it was assumed it was merely an attempt to legalize
company unions. Id.
203. 191 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
204. Id. at 644–48.
205. Id.
206. The court sets forth the definition without discussing its legislative origins in the Wagner
Act. Id. at 644.
207. 351 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
208. Id. at 774.
209. Id. at 773.
210. Id. at 774.
211. Id.
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we observe that this characterization of [Masters] as a “labor
organization” means simply that that entity, as presently constituted,
is such an organization for all purposes under the Act. In other words,
the use of the term “labor organization” in any section of the Act must
apply to [Masters] unless some further language of the section or its
legislative history indicates a contrary result.212
Cases like Di Giorgio Fruit and Masters strongly suggest that courts deciding
cases around the time of the enactment of the secondary boycott provisions did
not view the scope of the labor organization definition as being narrowed in
application to secondary boycotts. That is not good news for ALT-labor,
because it suggests that courts may find no interpretive reason arising from the
statute to narrow the labor organization definition in “external” secondary
boycott contexts.213
Stefan Marculewicz and Jennifer Thomas identified one explanation for
courts’ unwillingness to narrow interpretively the scope of the labor organization
definition.214 As they point out, the LMRDA—which was a substantial
amendment to the NLRA directed at, among other things, the corrupt internal
practices of unions—arguably broadened the labor organization definition.215
Some commentators have argued that the definition was narrowed rather than
broadened.216 However, it seems unlikely that the secondary provisions would
have been left unmodified if narrowing the definition had been legislatively
contemplated, particularly in the course of tinkering with the labor organization
definition in one part of the amended statute.
Thus, regardless of the theoretical validity of the contention that the internal
origins of the labor organization definition is not easily exportable to external
circumstances, courts have not said as much and, to the contrary, seem inclined
to adopt a universal statutory definition. This conclusion appears especially
troublesome for ALT-labor in the context of section 303 actions. While the
NLRB may continue at the administrative level to decline pursuit of section
8(b)(4) violations involving ALT-labor on the “pattern and practice” theory,
what the federal courts will do with the labor organization definition in the
context of secondary boycott cases is anyone’s guess. Although the courts have
been quite clear that individuals may not be sued under section 303,217 the courts

212. Id. at 777 (emphasis added).
213. There are, of course, many approaches that the court might use in marching through their
exegetical mission. See, e.g., Naduris-Weissman, supra note 32, at 273–74 (canvassing those
methods in the context of the labor organization question).
214. See Marculewicz & Thomas, supra note 84, at 85.
215. Id. Because part of the purpose of the amended statute was to eliminate union corruption,
it would not be logical to permit unions with opportunities to escape the labor organization
definition. However, broadening respecting internal applications does not ultimately speak to the
question of the appropriate scope of the labor organization definition in external applications.
216. See, e.g., Naduris-Weissman, supra note 32, at 289.
217. See, e.g., Schultz v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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make no distinction between unions and other kinds of labor organizations.
Indeed, there appear to be no cases discussing Cabot Carbon Co. or the NLRB’s
pattern or practice theory in the context of a section 303 action.
If an attorney were representing an ALT-labor group contemplating an
arguable secondary boycott, he or she would be unable to predict with
confidence whether his or her client would be deemed a labor organization by
the NLRB or by a federal district court. The best counsel would probably be
that the NLRB would likely not issue an administrative complaint or seek a 10(l)
injunction in connection with an ALT-labor secondary boycott. To make that
outcome more likely, the attorney should warn against: (1) setting up durable
bilateral mechanisms for interacting with employers, (2) establishing any
sustained negotiations with specific employers, or (3) focusing on individual
companies in broader campaigns.218 Yet avoiding these three actions would not
overcome an explicit statement in the group’s charter or mission statements that
the group exists for the purpose of dealing with employers over statutory
subjects. However, Cabot Carbon Co.’s undefined lower limits of conduct for
the establishment of labor organization status stands like a shadowy sentry
continually calling into question whether the above advice would carry the day.
Its lower boundaries could reach all the way to conferral of labor organization
status in a section 303 action.
III. TOWARD A “LABOR ORGANIZATION” BARGAIN
ALT-labor—indeed, all of labor—should understand the considerable risk to
nascent labor groups embedded in traditional labor law. Both unions and nontraditional labor advocates have been eager to avoid traditional labor law
because of its well-known deficiencies in adequately protecting the exercise of
concerted employee rights, especially during traditional representational
election campaigns.219 The question for the labor movement now is not whether
it should avoid traditional labor law because of its notoriously inadequate
protective shield, but whether the labor movement can avoid labor law as a
sword.220 The simple truth is that traditional labor law imposes significant
restraints on labor organizations, including the secondary boycott prohibitions

218. Eli Naduris-Weissman, Worker Centers & Traditional Labor Law: How to Stay on the
Good Side of the Law!, LAB. & EMP. COMMITTEE NAT’L LAWS. GUILD 1 (Jan. 2010), http://nlglaboremploy-comm.org/media/ProjWkrCtr_2010_Naduris-W_WkrCtrStratGuideLbrLaw.pdf
(Jan. 2010). See also Thomas Brom, Solidarity for Later, CAL. LAW., Dec. 2013., available at
http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?eid=932277&wteid=932277_Solidarity_for_Later.
219. See James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for
Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 828–30 (2005) (explaining that unions began to avoid
the NLRB altogether in the mid-1990s).
220. Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 471 (“As they grow in number and scope, worker centers will
have their development and effectiveness arrested by the very problem they were designed to avoid:
the regulation of and restrictions on labor organizations under the National Labor Relations Act
[].”).
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discussed in this Article221 and the fact that many ALT-labor groups almost
certainly fall within the labor organization definition.222
However, there is an opportunity for both labor and business. Devised in the
1930s as an important part of the original NLRA, the broad labor organization
definition was originally meant to ward off the early 1930s employer tactic of
creating puppet, in-house unions to distract employee interest in authentic
unions.223 The statutory strategy was to define labor organizations very broadly
and then to strictly prohibit employer involvement in them.224 The present
iteration of ALT-labor may be merely the tip of the proverbial iceberg with
respect to people who have simply “had enough” organizing themselves into
non-traditional or even unrecognizable kinds of groupings.
In all types of workplaces, non-union employees routinely initiate concerted
protest online, and the NLRB has in several cases acted to protect such
activity.225 Imagine a group of cyber protesters who, angry with their company,
electronically attempt to persuade other workers employed by other
companies—say customers of their company—not to go to work to pressure
their company to agree to their demands.226 The cyber group could be found a
labor organization and it might have violated secondary boycott prohibitions.
Even more broadly, one can conceive of low-wage workers as simply the front
edge of a rapidly expanding precariat. As commentator Katherine Stone wrote,
increasingly “workers are hired on temporary or fixed term contracts, without
any hope of regular employment. The new ‘precariat’ move in and out of the
labor market, earning low wages when they have work, and putting strains on
public welfare and health care systems when they do not.”227
Policy makers’ usual reaction to developments such as these is to argue that
the regulatory state should become more flexible to accommodate the new
221. See supra Part I.
222. See supra Part II.
223. LeRoy, supra note 105, at 1654–55.
224. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006) (providing it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
“to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it”).
225. See Steven Greenhouse, Even if it Enrages Your Boss, Social Net Speech is Protected,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2013, at A1.
226. See Martin H. Malin & Henry H Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in
Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) (hinting
at this emerging problem by noting that among the questions that will be considered are the types
of economic pressure that may lawfully be brought to bear on all-electronic workplaces). One
might add that both the questions of primary and secondary pressure will have to be considered. It
is extremely easy to imagine unintentional formation of an electronic, cyber “labor organization”
unwittingly “dealing with” an employer and then applying secondary pressure to it.
227. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Green Shoots in the Labor Market: A Cornucopia of Social
Experiments 7–10 (UCLA Sch. L., Law-Econ Research Paper No. 14-01, 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383575. See generally GUY STANDING, THE
PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS (2011) (explaining how this class of people creates
economic instability).
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economic reality.228 However, there is nothing new about this reality. It was
the reality of the nineteenth century, a reality that forward-thinking policy
makers and an energetic, organized working class was able to alter. The question
is whether unions wish to accept a world of flexibility or create a world of
stability, as did their forbearers, by assisting pockets of resistance, even if it
means risking changes in a statutory regime that has become more talismanic
than real.
Unions can diminish concern respecting modification of the labor
organization definition by thinking horizontally. The concerns associated with
dominated committees—internal employee committees arguably “dealing with”
employers respecting conditions of employment—arose during a time when
there was some prospect of an intra-workplace struggle, a vertical contest over
control of continuing employment. Now, however, unions will be more likely
to turn to the business of what might be called “serial organizing.” Serial
organizing recognizes that workers will increasingly be moving quickly, from
insecure job to insecure job. It makes little sense for a union to expend resources
to organize workers in ephemeral workplaces. Rather, organization will most
efficiently be undertaken between workplaces, guiding, educating, and
“connecting up” workers as they themselves engage in quick, sharp conflicts
with their precariat employers.229
A recent labor dispute illustrates this idea. On January 28, 2014, a worker at
a Whole Foods grocery store in Chicago missed work when she had to stay home
with her special needs child because school was cancelled as a result of a
snowstorm.230 The woman and her co-workers, none of whom were represented
by a union, believed that they had previously negotiated an attendance policy
agreement with their employer that would have excused the woman under its
terms.231 However, the woman was fired, and her co-workers walked off the job
in protest.232 One of the employees interviewed in connection with the job action
said,
[w]e’re not “union workers” in the sense that we don’t have a
contract—we certainly would like to have one eventually. . . . But the
reality is that the union is you deciding with your co-workers to

228. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 227, at 7–10.
229. As this Article goes to print, it appears that the Service Employees International Union
(SEIU) is beginning to get the idea. In July 2014, SEIU sponsored a convention of 1200 fast food
employees in an expo center west of Chicago. Steven Greenhouse, Fast-Food Workers Intensify
Fight for $15 an Hour, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2014, at B1. Reportedly, the union has recently
injected 15 million dollars into the fast food worker controversies broadly across the industry. Id.
230. Josh Eidelson, That’s Cold, Whole Foods: Polar Vortex Firing Spurs Chicago Strike,
SALON (Feb. 5, 2014, 9:42 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/02/05/thats_cold_whole_foods_
polar_vortex_firing_spurs_chicago_strike/.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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actually join together and exert collective power against the boss.
That’s what the essence of a union is.233
After the walkout, Chicago Teachers Union President Karen Lewis headlined
a supportive rally that was organized by the Workers Organizing Committee of
Chicago.234
This story illustrates that workers are capable of independent, smaller-scale
organizing at their own discrete workplaces and of conceptualizing, in broad
terms, collective power. Additionally, unions are capable of connecting with
those workers afterwards.235 However, it also illustrates some of the
coordination risks under discussion in this Article. The magazine article from
which the story is recounted does not mention the location of the rally, the
message of the rally participants, or to whom the message was directed. As
discussed above, these inquiries would be critical in assessing whether an
employer could allege a secondary boycott.236
Some have argued that sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) should simply be eliminated
because the interplay of the provisions leaves employees, as a practical matter,
with a choice between unionized participation in workplace governance and no
participation at all.237 Professor Clyde Summers has argued, however, that if
section 8(a)(2) were eliminated, it would set the stage for massive employer antiunion campaigns and the establishment of sham unions that employees would
be poorly equipped to identify.238 A similar outcome might be produced, of
course, if section 2(5)’s labor organization definition were narrowed in some
manner to cover “a certified union” or a “union representing employees,” or
something of the sort. A narrower definition might mean that employers could
establish and dominate non-labor organizations not fitting into the narrower
definition, thereby deceiving employees into thinking they have independent
representation when they do not.

233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See generally supra note 220.
236. A press release for a nationwide work stoppage slated for September 4, 2014 issued by
the organization “Strike Fast Food,” presumably an offshoot or reconfiguration of the Fast Food
Forward group referenced in this Article, noted that health care workers were expected to
participate in the stoppage. Press Release, Strike Fast Food, Fast Food Workers to Strike Thursday
as Fight for $15 and Union Rights Intensifies (Sept. 2, 2014), available at
http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2014/09/02/fast-food-workers-strike-thursday-fight15-and-union-rights-intensifies. It is hard to believe that cross-industry ALT-labor coordination
will not increase. See Jillian Berman, Why This Week’s Fast Food Protests Are ‘History In The
Making’,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Sept.
4,
2014
9:43
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/04/fast-food-protests_n_5760882.html (noting the new
development of low-wage workers from different industries now joining forces).
237. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structured
Exception to Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129, 140–41 (1993) (discussing and rejecting
the views of those who advocate the sections’ elimination).
238. Id. at 141.
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To contend with this problem, some propose a modified section 8(a)(2) that
would ban employers from installing organizations “that purport to function as
the independent collective agency of the workers,” but would in all other
respects permit business-related employee participation schemes.239 Such a
modification might simultaneously narrow the applicability of section 2(5),
possibly having the practical effect of rescuing ALT-labor from secondary
boycott liability. However, when considering such modifications, there is no
escaping the continuing risk of employee deception engendered by relaxation of
the section 2(5) labor organization definition if section 8(a)(2) is simultaneously
weakened.
Labor-sympathetic commentators have also argued for the elimination of
section 8(b)(4) altogether. Professor Julius Getman has contended, for example
that,
[s]ection 8(b)(4) places massive and unique limitations upon the
ability of unions to use economic pressure to support each other’s
strikes. No one doubts that its repeal would be a great victory for
unions and that legislative achievement of this goal has been long
sought and almost impossible to achieve.240
That may be true, but such a thing seemed practically impossible a decade
ago, and is virtually unthinkable in the present ossified reality. Similarly,
employers have had an intense interest for over a decade in modifying or
abolishing section 8(a)(2) or section 2(5) of the NLRA, or both, and this interest
culminated in the passage of the Teamwork for Employees and Management Act
(TEAM) in 1995,241 a bill that was ultimately vetoed by Bill Clinton.242 While
the TEAM Act, or something like it, has had its supporters over the years, it is
just as obvious that it cannot pass in the current political environment as it is that
secondary boycott liability for unions will not be eliminated.

239. Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the “Company Union” Prohibition: The
Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125, 127 (1994).
240. Julius Getman, National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can We Fix It?, 45
B.C. L. REV. 125, 140 (2003).
241. H.R. REP. NO. 104-743, at 1 (1995); S. REP. NO. 104-295, at 2 (1996). Section 3 of the
Bill would have amended section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA as follows:
Provided further, that it shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice
under this paragraph for an employer to establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any
organization or entity of any kind, in which employees participate, to address matters of
mutual interest, including issues of quality, productivity and efficiency, and which does
not have, claim, or seek authority to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining
agreements with the employer or to amend existing collective bargaining agreements
between the employer and any labor organization.
S. REP. NO. 104-295. Although the Bill would have amended section 8(a)(2), the language would
also effectively have amended section 2(5).
242. Rafael Gely, Whose Team are You On? My Team or my TEAM?: The NLRA’s Section
8(a)(2) and the TEAM Act, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 323, 325 n.4 (1997).
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It would be hard to argue that the present environment is not more polarized
than it was during the Clinton Administration. The surprisingly underdeveloped
and unpredictable law surrounding the labor organization definition explored in
this Article, and in the work of leading commentators like Eli NadurisWeismann, leads to the conclusion that some present and future ALT-labor
groups may be found to be labor organizations and some may not. However, the
likelihood of litigation over the labor organization question is not so
unpredictable. As things stand now, it is easy to imagine secondary boycott
cases being decided one way at the NLRB and in an entirely different manner in
the federal courts, for example in the course of section 303 actions. That kind
of uncertainty does not seem desirable for anyone.
Those outside of business circles opposed to unions on policy grounds might
also support a re-worked labor organization definition for reasons other than the
reflexive rationale that it could increase opportunities for employers to establish
participatory committees. A libertarian argument in support of ALT-labor has
been under discussion recently: ALT-labor, whatever it is, represents a labor
relations model outside the “compulsory unionism” that conservatives and
libertarians tend to deride. If we conceive of union unfair labor practices as the
Taft-Hartley policy counterweight to exclusive representation and employeefunded unions, ALT-labor is outside that paradigm. It does not enjoy
governmental, exclusive representation protection.243
In the NLRA regime (as in any functioning political democracy), the majority
rules and achieves governmental status, and that is in theory the end of the
matter. Any non-majority, non-supporting employee interests are to yield and
to support financially the union to the limits of a representational ceiling. As
one is often told in discussions of employment at will, one is always “free” to
quit.244 This is a rational, if sometimes scorned, free-rider policy. ALT-labor—
though it is hard to speak of it monolithically—appears to be entirely voluntary
under any reasonable definition of the term. No employee is required to join or
support it as a condition of employment. Arguably, then, it represents a “free
market” alternative to unionism, even if it is unclear whether it is an actual
alternative since at this early date it has not delivered much more than positive
public relations for low-wage workers. Still, such groups seem evocative of a
certain nineteenth century élan, a panache that might have been embraced by
Samuel Gompers and the “libertarians” of his day.245 These groups are
supported substantially by private money and not in any meaningful way by the
State.
243. Robert VerBruggen, Why Conservatives Should Love ‘Alt-Labor’, REAL CLEAR POL’Y
(Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/16/why_conservatives_should_
love_alt-labor.html.
244. See Benjamin Sachs, Conservatives, Alt-Labor, and “Coercion”, ONLABOR (Oct. 22,
2013), http://onlabor.org/2013/10/21/conservatives-alt-labor-and-coercion/.
245. Aaron Steelman, If Only Samuel Gompers Were Alive Today, CATO INST. (Oct. 28, 1996),
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/only-samuel-gompers-were-alive-today.
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Labor advocates will continue to see threats to unions’ bargaining exclusivity
in attempts to loosen the section 2(5) and 8(a)(2) lockboxes. There are two
immediate responses to this concern. First, either unions want to help ALTlabor or they do not. If they want to help, they will have to eventually address
the labor organization vulnerability discussed in this Article. Second, if the
underlying dynamic of the labor relationship is fundamentally adversarial and
inevitable, unions have nothing to fear from non-union participatory schemes.
The model cannot lead anywhere under that assumption because, at the end of
the day, the boss will not give up anything significantly affecting the bottom
line. Once workers are organized in their “action committees,” and see what is
not happening, they may be more inclined to wonder what happens next, than if
they had never been in such a group. Unions might find themselves in a good
position to call the participatory bluff and dare management to allow authentic
competition between unions and committees. Perhaps unions will find ways to
access employees participating in internal groups to help them leverage an
ongoing credible threat of independent unionism.246 This may sharpen unions
and employees alike in an even broader “School for Democracy,”247 and put to
rest conservative claims that unions fear competition and insist upon
monopoly.248 Given the overall weakness of labor law, what do unions really
have to lose?
The time seems opportune for a compromise. Organized labor and businesses
should push jointly for a narrowing of the section 2(5) definition and make
certain that the definition means in practice that the now-and-future ALT-labor
is not subject to liability under the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA.
Michael LeRoy has proposed the following amendment to section 8(a)(2):
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section, it shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice for an employer
to form or maintain a committee in which employees participate to at
least the same extent practicable as representatives of management
participate to discuss with it matters of mutual interest, including
grievances, wages, hours of employment and other working
conditions, and which does not have, claim, or seek authority to be the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees or to enter into
collective bargaining agreements between the employer and any labor
organization, except that in a case in which a labor organization is the

246. See LeRoy, supra note 105, at 1702 (discussing the Canadian experience and how
“employees are able to leverage [] internal democracy with a credible threat to unionize”).
247. See Garden, supra note 177, at 2657.
248. Countless possibilities exist as to what might be done once the dyadic frame has been
loosened or eliminated. For an exhaustive discussion along these lines, see generally Mark
Barenberg, Democracy And Domination In The Law of Workplace Cooperation: From
Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (1994).
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representative of such employees as provided in section 9(a), this
proviso shall not apply.249
This language, which essentially keeps intact the broad definition of a labor
organization, but partially insulates the employer from violations in connection
with it, should be accepted. However, we should go further to clarify that the
conceptual structure identified in the language that would seem to include much
of ALT-labor—a group that “does not have, claim, or seek authority to be the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees or to enter into collective
bargaining agreements between the employer and any labor organization”—is
similarly insulated from liability under section 8(b)(4)(B).
IV. CONCLUSION
The transparent reasons for the emergence of ALT-labor groups are the reality
of weak labor law protections for employees and the broad formation of a
transient precariat. In this environment, unions have been unable to gain
traction. But labor law, with all its weaknesses and maddening irrelevance in
certain contexts, has prohibitory dimensions that must not be ignored. For some
observers, ALT-labor represents the potential for a reinvigorated labor
movement and an energized precariat. For others, ALT-labor represents, at least
with respect to low wage workers, an exercise in futility—no amount of
pressure, they claim, will force employers to pay wages and benefits that the
market simply will not bear. To an observer of labor history, however, ALTlabor is a vulnerable, fragile phenomenon likely to be dealt with—if agitation
intensifies—as militant labor has always been dealt with in the United States:
suppression through injunctions and civil actions.
Secondary boycott
prohibitions are an engine that could possibly drive such litigation. Workers
flouting secondary boycott prohibitions would be engaging in civil
disobedience. Civil disobedience will always have its risks and costs, but
defiance in the face of the risk is a course some might choose.250 However, the
risks should be understood. Communicating the nature of the risk is not arguing
against its legitimacy.
Nevertheless, the pragmatic conclusion of this Article is that ALT-labor
groups would be well advised to disavow in explicit terms any purpose of
negotiating with employers. The better course is to train workers in discrete
workplaces how they can engage in negotiations. Such a disavowal should
diminish, but not eliminate, arguments that an ALT-labor group’s purpose is to
“deal with” employers. It would have to be followed by conduct from which a
249. LeRoy, supra note 105, at 1708–09. As Professor LeRoy explains, the proposal is an
amalgam of sections of the TEAM Act and of a committee proposal arising during the Taft-Hartley
deliberations. Id. at 1706–07.
250. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Fast-Food Workers Seeking $15 Wage Plan Civil
Disobedience at Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2014, at B3 (noting that in September 2014 strikes,
“labor organizers plan[ned] to increase the pressure [on employers] by staging widespread civil
disobedience and having thousands of home-care workers join the protests”).
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“pattern and practice” of interacting with employers was found insufficiently
pervasive for a legal fact finder to discover a “bilateral mechanism.” It is
reasonable to think that courts will not be quick to equate “pure” protest directed
at an employer with a “dealing with” purpose sufficient to create labor
organization status, thereby exposing ALT-labor to secondary boycott liability.
Thus, ALT-labor should be careful to direct its protest message to the general
public wherever possible.
More broadly, “outside” civil society groups are becoming increasingly
invested in ALT-labor, which represents one face of the precariat. Restricting
ALT-labor conduct that might, if engaged in by a union, violate the NLRA is an
altogether different exercise than regulating “industrial strife.” One hopes that
such restrictions would be undertaken, if at all, only with the greatest caution
and subjected to strict scrutiny. A good way to avoid impacts on the broader
civil society is to ensure that ALT-labor is not subjected to the secondary boycott
provisions of the NLRA. Whether or not organized labor and business can
negotiate some kind of deal that Congress would be willing to accept and enact
through legislation, it is in the broader public interest that the government not be
permitted to further conflate traditional labor regulation with historically
protected speech and protest.
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